| /* Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. |
| * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| * found in the LICENSE file. */ |
| |
| #define _BSD_SOURCE |
| #define _GNU_SOURCE |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <grp.h> |
| #include <inttypes.h> |
| #include <linux/capability.h> |
| #include <linux/securebits.h> |
| #include <pwd.h> |
| #include <sched.h> |
| #include <signal.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <syscall.h> |
| #include <sys/capability.h> |
| #include <sys/mount.h> |
| #include <sys/prctl.h> |
| #include <sys/wait.h> |
| #include <syslog.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include "libminijail.h" |
| #include "libminijail-private.h" |
| |
| struct minijail { |
| struct { |
| int uid : 1; |
| int gid : 1; |
| int caps : 1; |
| int vfs : 1; |
| int pids : 1; |
| int seccomp : 1; |
| int readonly : 1; |
| int usergroups : 1; |
| int ptrace : 1; |
| } flags; |
| uid_t uid; |
| gid_t gid; |
| gid_t usergid; |
| const char *user; |
| uint64_t caps; |
| pid_t initpid; |
| }; |
| |
| static void pdie(const char *failed) { |
| syslog(LOG_ERR, "libminijail: %s failed: %s", failed, strerror(errno)); |
| abort(); |
| } |
| |
| static void die(const char *failed) { |
| syslog(LOG_ERR, "libminijail: %s", failed); |
| abort(); |
| } |
| |
| struct minijail *minijail_new(void) { |
| struct minijail *j = malloc(sizeof(*j)); |
| if (j) |
| memset(j, 0, sizeof(*j)); |
| return j; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_change_uid(struct minijail *j, uid_t uid) { |
| if (uid == 0) |
| die("useless change to uid 0"); |
| j->uid = uid; |
| j->flags.uid = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_change_gid(struct minijail *j, gid_t gid) { |
| if (gid == 0) |
| die("useless change to gid 0"); |
| j->gid = gid; |
| j->flags.gid = 1; |
| } |
| |
| int minijail_change_user(struct minijail *j, const char *user) { |
| /* In principle this should use getpwnam(), but: |
| * 1) getpwnam_r() isn't actually reentrant anyway, since it uses a |
| * statically-allocated file descriptor internally |
| * 2) fgetpwnam() (by analogy with fgetpwent) would solve (1) except that it |
| * doesn't exist |
| * 3) sysconf() (see getpwnam_r(3)) is allowed to return a size that is not |
| * large enough, which means having to loop on growing the buffer we pass |
| * in |
| */ |
| struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(user); |
| if (!pw) |
| return errno; |
| minijail_change_uid(j, pw->pw_uid); |
| j->user = user; |
| j->usergid = pw->pw_gid; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int minijail_change_group(struct minijail *j, const char *group) { |
| /* In principle this should use getgrnam(), but: |
| * 1) getgrnam_r() isn't actually reentrant anyway, since it uses a |
| * statically-allocated file descriptor internally |
| * 2) fgetgrnam() (by analogy with fgetgrent) would solve (1) except that it |
| * doesn't exist |
| * 3) sysconf() (see getgrnam_r(3)) is allowed to return a size that is not |
| * large enough, which means having to loop on growing the buffer we pass |
| * in |
| */ |
| struct group *gr = getgrnam(group); |
| if (!gr) |
| return errno; |
| minijail_change_gid(j, gr->gr_gid); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_use_seccomp(struct minijail *j) { |
| j->flags.seccomp = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_use_caps(struct minijail *j, uint64_t capmask) { |
| j->caps = capmask; |
| j->flags.caps = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_namespace_vfs(struct minijail *j) { |
| j->flags.vfs = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_namespace_pids(struct minijail *j) { |
| j->flags.pids = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_remount_readonly(struct minijail *j) { |
| j->flags.vfs = 1; |
| j->flags.readonly = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_inherit_usergroups(struct minijail *j) { |
| j->flags.usergroups = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_disable_ptrace(struct minijail *j) { |
| j->flags.ptrace = 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int remount_readonly(void) { |
| const char *kProcPath = "/proc"; |
| const unsigned int kSafeFlags = MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID; |
| /* Right now, we're holding a reference to our parent's old mount of /proc in |
| * our namespace, which means using MS_REMOUNT here would mutate our parent's |
| * mount as well, even though we're in a VFS namespace (!). Instead, remove |
| * their mount from our namespace and make our own. */ |
| if (umount(kProcPath)) |
| return errno; |
| if (mount("", kProcPath, "proc", kSafeFlags | MS_RDONLY, "")) |
| return errno; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void drop_caps(const struct minijail *j) { |
| cap_t caps = cap_get_proc(); |
| cap_value_t raise_flag[1]; |
| unsigned int i; |
| if (!caps) |
| die("can't get process caps"); |
| if (cap_clear_flag(caps, CAP_INHERITABLE)) |
| die("can't clear inheritable caps"); |
| if (cap_clear_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE)) |
| die("can't clear effective caps"); |
| if (cap_clear_flag(caps, CAP_PERMITTED)) |
| die("can't clear permitted caps"); |
| for (i = 0; i < sizeof(j->caps) * 8 && cap_valid((int)i); ++i) { |
| if (i != CAP_SETPCAP && !(j->caps & (1 << i))) |
| continue; |
| raise_flag[0] = i; |
| if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, raise_flag, CAP_SET)) |
| die("can't add effective cap"); |
| if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, raise_flag, CAP_SET)) |
| die("can't add permitted cap"); |
| if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, raise_flag, CAP_SET)) |
| die("can't add inheritable cap"); |
| } |
| if (cap_set_proc(caps)) |
| die("can't apply cleaned capset"); |
| cap_free(caps); |
| for (i = 0; i < sizeof(j->caps) * 8 && cap_valid((int)i); ++i) { |
| if (j->caps & (1 << i)) |
| continue; |
| if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) |
| pdie("prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP)"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_enter(const struct minijail *j) { |
| if (j->flags.pids) |
| die("tried to enter a pid-namespaced jail; try minijail_run()?"); |
| |
| if (j->flags.usergroups && !j->user) |
| die("usergroup inheritance without username"); |
| |
| /* We can't recover from failures if we've dropped privileges partially, |
| * so we don't even try. If any of our operations fail, we abort() the |
| * entire process. */ |
| if (j->flags.vfs && unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)) |
| pdie("unshare"); |
| |
| if (j->flags.readonly && remount_readonly()) |
| pdie("remount"); |
| |
| if (j->flags.caps) { |
| /* POSIX capabilities are a bit tricky. If we drop our capability to change |
| * uids, our attempt to use setuid() below will fail. Hang on to root caps |
| * across setuid(), then lock securebits. */ |
| if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1)) |
| pdie("prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS)"); |
| if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECURE_ALL_BITS | SECURE_ALL_LOCKS)) |
| pdie("prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS)"); |
| } |
| |
| if (j->flags.usergroups && initgroups(j->user, j->usergid)) |
| pdie("initgroups"); |
| else if (!j->flags.usergroups && setgroups(0, NULL)) |
| pdie("setgroups"); |
| |
| if (j->flags.gid && setresgid(j->gid, j->gid, j->gid)) |
| pdie("setresgid"); |
| |
| if (j->flags.uid && setresuid(j->uid, j->uid, j->uid)) |
| pdie("setresuid"); |
| |
| if (j->flags.caps) |
| drop_caps(j); |
| |
| /* seccomp has to come last since it cuts off all the other |
| * privilege-dropping syscalls :) */ |
| if (j->flags.seccomp && prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1)) |
| pdie("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)"); |
| } |
| |
| static int init_exitstatus = 0; |
| |
| static void init_term(int __attribute__((unused)) sig) { |
| _exit(init_exitstatus); |
| } |
| |
| static int init(pid_t rootpid) { |
| pid_t pid; |
| int status; |
| signal(SIGTERM, init_term); /* so that we exit with the right status */ |
| while ((pid = wait(&status)) > 0) { |
| /* This loop will only end when either there are no processes left inside |
| * our pid namespace or we get a signal. */ |
| if (pid == rootpid) |
| init_exitstatus = status; |
| } |
| if (!WIFEXITED(init_exitstatus)) |
| _exit(MINIJAIL_ERR_INIT); |
| _exit(WEXITSTATUS(init_exitstatus)); |
| } |
| |
| /** @brief Move any commands that need to be done post-exec into an environment |
| * variable |
| * @param j Jail to move commands from. |
| * |
| * Serializes post-exec() commands into a string, removes them from the jail, |
| * and adds them to the environment; they will be deserialized later (see |
| * __minijail_preloaded) and executed inside the execve()'d process. |
| */ |
| static int move_commands_to_env(struct minijail *j) { |
| const int kEnvBufSize = 256; |
| const char *ptrace = j->flags.ptrace ? "ptrace " : ""; |
| const char *seccomp = j->flags.seccomp ? "seccomp " : ""; |
| char setuid[64] = ""; |
| char caps[32] = ""; |
| char *newenv; |
| char *oldenv; |
| char *envbuf = malloc(kEnvBufSize); |
| int r; |
| |
| if (!envbuf) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| if (j->flags.caps) |
| snprintf(caps, sizeof(caps), "caps=%" PRIx64 " ", j->caps); |
| |
| if (j->flags.uid && j->flags.caps) { |
| snprintf(setuid, sizeof(setuid), "uid=%d ", j->uid); |
| j->flags.uid = 0; |
| } |
| |
| j->flags.caps = 0; |
| j->flags.ptrace = 0; |
| j->flags.seccomp = 0; |
| |
| r = snprintf(envbuf, kEnvBufSize, "%s%s%s%s", setuid, ptrace, seccomp, caps); |
| if (!r) { |
| /* No commands generated, so no preload needed :) */ |
| free(envbuf); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (r == kEnvBufSize) { |
| free(envbuf); |
| return -E2BIG; |
| } |
| |
| oldenv = getenv(kLdPreloadEnvVar) ? : ""; |
| newenv = malloc(strlen(oldenv) + 2 + strlen(PRELOADPATH)); |
| if (!newenv) { |
| free(envbuf); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| |
| /* Only insert a separating space if we have something to separate... */ |
| sprintf(newenv, "%s%s%s", oldenv, strlen(oldenv) ? " " : "", PRELOADPATH); |
| |
| /* setenv() makes a copy of the string we give it */ |
| setenv(kLdPreloadEnvVar, newenv, 1); |
| setenv(kCommandEnvVar, envbuf, 1); |
| free(newenv); |
| free(envbuf); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int minijail_run(struct minijail *j, const char *filename, char *const argv[]) { |
| unsigned int pidns = j->flags.pids ? CLONE_NEWPID : 0; |
| char *oldenv, *oldenv_copy = NULL; |
| pid_t r; |
| |
| oldenv = getenv(kLdPreloadEnvVar); |
| if (oldenv) { |
| oldenv_copy = strdup(oldenv); |
| if (!oldenv_copy) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| |
| r = move_commands_to_env(j); |
| if (r) { |
| /* No environment variable is modified if move_commands_to_env returns |
| * a non-zero value. */ |
| free(oldenv_copy); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| r = syscall(SYS_clone, pidns | SIGCHLD, NULL); |
| if (r > 0) { |
| if (oldenv_copy) { |
| setenv(kLdPreloadEnvVar, oldenv_copy, 1); |
| free(oldenv_copy); |
| } else { |
| unsetenv(kLdPreloadEnvVar); |
| } |
| unsetenv(kCommandEnvVar); |
| j->initpid = r; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| free(oldenv_copy); |
| |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| j->flags.pids = 0; |
| |
| /* Jail this process and its descendants... */ |
| minijail_enter(j); |
| |
| if (pidns) { |
| /* pid namespace: this process will become init inside the new namespace, so |
| * fork off a child to actually run the program (we don't want all programs |
| * we might exec to have to know how to be init). */ |
| r = fork(); |
| if (r < 0) |
| _exit(r); |
| else if (r > 0) |
| init(r); /* never returns */ |
| } |
| |
| /* If we aren't pid-namespaced: |
| * calling process |
| * -> execve()-ing process |
| * If we are: |
| * calling process |
| * -> init()-ing process |
| * -> execve()-ing process |
| */ |
| _exit(execve(filename, argv, environ)); |
| } |
| |
| int minijail_kill(struct minijail *j) { |
| int st; |
| if (kill(j->initpid, SIGTERM)) |
| return errno; |
| if (waitpid(j->initpid, &st, 0) < 0) |
| return errno; |
| return st; |
| } |
| |
| int minijail_wait(struct minijail *j) { |
| int st; |
| if (waitpid(j->initpid, &st, 0) < 0) |
| return errno; |
| if (!WIFEXITED(st)) |
| return MINIJAIL_ERR_JAIL; |
| return WEXITSTATUS(st); |
| } |
| |
| void minijail_destroy(struct minijail *j) { |
| free(j); |
| } |