| /* $NetBSD: print-ah.c,v 1.4 1996/05/20 00:41:16 fvdl Exp $ */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 |
| * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that: (1) source code distributions |
| * retain the above copyright notice and this paragraph in its entirety, (2) |
| * distributions including binary code include the above copyright notice and |
| * this paragraph in its entirety in the documentation or other materials |
| * provided with the distribution, and (3) all advertising materials mentioning |
| * features or use of this software display the following acknowledgement: |
| * ``This product includes software developed by the University of California, |
| * Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and its contributors.'' Neither the name of |
| * the University nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse |
| * or promote products derived from this software without specific prior |
| * written permission. |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED |
| * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| */ |
| |
| /* \summary: IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) printer */ |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H |
| #include <config.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "netdissect-stdinc.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| |
| /* Any code in this file that depends on HAVE_LIBCRYPTO depends on |
| * HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H too. Undefining the former when the latter isn't defined |
| * is the simplest way of handling the dependency. |
| */ |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #else |
| #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "netdissect.h" |
| #include "extract.h" |
| |
| #include "diag-control.h" |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| #include "strtoaddr.h" |
| #include "ascii_strcasecmp.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "ip.h" |
| #include "ip6.h" |
| |
| /* |
| * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project. |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors |
| * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software |
| * without specific prior written permission. |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * RFC1827/2406 Encapsulated Security Payload. |
| */ |
| |
| struct newesp { |
| nd_uint32_t esp_spi; /* ESP */ |
| nd_uint32_t esp_seq; /* Sequence number */ |
| /*variable size*/ /* (IV and) Payload data */ |
| /*variable size*/ /* padding */ |
| /*8bit*/ /* pad size */ |
| /*8bit*/ /* next header */ |
| /*8bit*/ /* next header */ |
| /*variable size, 32bit bound*/ /* Authentication data */ |
| }; |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| union inaddr_u { |
| nd_ipv4 in4; |
| nd_ipv6 in6; |
| }; |
| struct sa_list { |
| struct sa_list *next; |
| u_int daddr_version; |
| union inaddr_u daddr; |
| uint32_t spi; /* if == 0, then IKEv2 */ |
| int initiator; |
| u_char spii[8]; /* for IKEv2 */ |
| u_char spir[8]; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *evp; |
| u_int ivlen; |
| int authlen; |
| u_char authsecret[256]; |
| int authsecret_len; |
| u_char secret[256]; /* is that big enough for all secrets? */ |
| int secretlen; |
| }; |
| |
| #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_NEW |
| /* |
| * Allocate an EVP_CIPHER_CTX. |
| * Used if we have an older version of OpenSSL that doesn't provide |
| * routines to allocate and free them. |
| */ |
| static EVP_CIPHER_CTX * |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; |
| |
| ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
| if (ctx == NULL) |
| return (NULL); |
| memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); |
| return (ctx); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
| free(ctx); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_EVP_DECRYPTINIT_EX |
| /* |
| * Initialize the cipher by calling EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), because |
| * calling EVP_DecryptInit() will reset the cipher context, clearing |
| * the cipher, so calling it twice, with the second call having a |
| * null cipher, will clear the already-set cipher. EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), |
| * however, won't reset the cipher context, so you can use it to specify |
| * the IV in a second call after a first call to EVP_DecryptInit_ex() |
| * to set the cipher and the key. |
| * |
| * XXX - is there some reason why we need to make two calls? |
| */ |
| static int |
| set_cipher_parameters(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv) |
| { |
| return EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv); |
| } |
| #else |
| /* |
| * Initialize the cipher by calling EVP_DecryptInit(), because we don't |
| * have EVP_DecryptInit_ex(); we rely on it not trashing the context. |
| */ |
| static int |
| set_cipher_parameters(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv) |
| { |
| return EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static u_char * |
| do_decrypt(netdissect_options *ndo, const char *caller, struct sa_list *sa, |
| const u_char *iv, const u_char *ct, unsigned int ctlen) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; |
| unsigned int block_size; |
| unsigned int ptlen; |
| u_char *pt; |
| int len; |
| |
| ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Failed to initialize the cipher context. |
| * From a look at the OpenSSL code, this appears to |
| * mean "couldn't allocate memory for the cipher context"; |
| * note that we're not passing any parameters, so there's |
| * not much else it can mean. |
| */ |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC, |
| "%s: can't allocate memory for cipher context", caller); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (set_cipher_parameters(ctx, sa->evp, sa->secret, NULL) < 0) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "%s: espkey init failed", caller); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (set_cipher_parameters(ctx, NULL, NULL, iv) < 0) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "%s: IV init failed", caller); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * At least as I read RFC 5996 section 3.14 and RFC 4303 section 2.4, |
| * if the cipher has a block size of which the ciphertext's size must |
| * be a multiple, the payload must be padded to make that happen, so |
| * the ciphertext length must be a multiple of the block size. Fail |
| * if that's not the case. |
| */ |
| block_size = (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); |
| if ((ctlen % block_size) != 0) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, |
| "%s: ciphertext size %u is not a multiple of the cipher block size %u", |
| caller, ctlen, block_size); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Attempt to allocate a buffer for the decrypted data, because |
| * we can't decrypt on top of the input buffer. |
| */ |
| ptlen = ctlen; |
| pt = (u_char *)calloc(1, ptlen); |
| if (pt == NULL) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC, |
| "%s: can't allocate memory for decryption buffer", caller); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The size of the ciphertext handed to us is a multiple of the |
| * cipher block size, so we don't need to worry about padding. |
| */ |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0)) { |
| free(pt); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, |
| "%s: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding failed", caller); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, pt, &len, ct, ctlen)) { |
| free(pt); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "%s: EVP_DecryptUpdate failed", |
| caller); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
| return pt; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This will allocate a new buffer containing the decrypted data. |
| * It returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. |
| * |
| * It will push the new buffer and the values of ndo->ndo_packetp and |
| * ndo->ndo_snapend onto the buffer stack, and change ndo->ndo_packetp |
| * and ndo->ndo_snapend to refer to the new buffer. |
| * |
| * Our caller must pop the buffer off the stack when it's finished |
| * dissecting anything in it and before it does any dissection of |
| * anything in the old buffer. That will free the new buffer. |
| */ |
| DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION |
| int esp_decrypt_buffer_by_ikev2_print(netdissect_options *ndo, |
| int initiator, |
| const u_char spii[8], |
| const u_char spir[8], |
| const u_char *buf, const u_char *end) |
| { |
| struct sa_list *sa; |
| const u_char *iv; |
| const u_char *ct; |
| unsigned int ctlen; |
| u_char *pt; |
| |
| /* initiator arg is any non-zero value */ |
| if(initiator) initiator=1; |
| |
| /* see if we can find the SA, and if so, decode it */ |
| for (sa = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; sa != NULL; sa = sa->next) { |
| if (sa->spi == 0 |
| && initiator == sa->initiator |
| && memcmp(spii, sa->spii, 8) == 0 |
| && memcmp(spir, sa->spir, 8) == 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if(sa == NULL) return 0; |
| if(sa->evp == NULL) return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * remove authenticator, and see if we still have something to |
| * work with |
| */ |
| end = end - sa->authlen; |
| iv = buf; |
| ct = iv + sa->ivlen; |
| ctlen = end-ct; |
| |
| if(end <= ct) return 0; |
| |
| pt = do_decrypt(ndo, __func__, sa, iv, |
| ct, ctlen); |
| if (pt == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Switch to the output buffer for dissection, and save it |
| * on the buffer stack so it can be freed; our caller must |
| * pop it when done. |
| */ |
| if (!nd_push_buffer(ndo, pt, pt, ctlen)) { |
| free(pt); |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC, |
| "%s: can't push buffer on buffer stack", __func__); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION |
| |
| static void esp_print_addsa(netdissect_options *ndo, |
| const struct sa_list *sa, int sa_def) |
| { |
| /* copy the "sa" */ |
| |
| struct sa_list *nsa; |
| |
| /* malloc() return used in a 'struct sa_list': do not free() */ |
| nsa = (struct sa_list *)malloc(sizeof(struct sa_list)); |
| if (nsa == NULL) |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC, |
| "%s: malloc", __func__); |
| |
| *nsa = *sa; |
| |
| if (sa_def) |
| ndo->ndo_sa_default = nsa; |
| |
| nsa->next = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; |
| ndo->ndo_sa_list_head = nsa; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u_int hexdigit(netdissect_options *ndo, char hex) |
| { |
| if (hex >= '0' && hex <= '9') |
| return (hex - '0'); |
| else if (hex >= 'A' && hex <= 'F') |
| return (hex - 'A' + 10); |
| else if (hex >= 'a' && hex <= 'f') |
| return (hex - 'a' + 10); |
| else { |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_ESP_SECRET, |
| "invalid hex digit %c in espsecret\n", hex); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static u_int hex2byte(netdissect_options *ndo, char *hexstring) |
| { |
| u_int byte; |
| |
| byte = (hexdigit(ndo, hexstring[0]) << 4) + hexdigit(ndo, hexstring[1]); |
| return byte; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * returns size of binary, 0 on failure. |
| */ |
| static int |
| espprint_decode_hex(netdissect_options *ndo, |
| u_char *binbuf, unsigned int binbuf_len, char *hex) |
| { |
| unsigned int len; |
| int i; |
| |
| len = strlen(hex) / 2; |
| |
| if (len > binbuf_len) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "secret is too big: %u\n", len); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| i = 0; |
| while (hex[0] != '\0' && hex[1]!='\0') { |
| binbuf[i] = hex2byte(ndo, hex); |
| hex += 2; |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * decode the form: SPINUM@IP <tab> ALGONAME:0xsecret |
| */ |
| |
| DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION |
| static int |
| espprint_decode_encalgo(netdissect_options *ndo, |
| char *decode, struct sa_list *sa) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *evp; |
| int authlen = 0; |
| char *colon, *p; |
| |
| colon = strchr(decode, ':'); |
| if (colon == NULL) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "failed to decode espsecret: %s\n", decode); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *colon = '\0'; |
| |
| if (strlen(decode) > strlen("-hmac96") && |
| !strcmp(decode + strlen(decode) - strlen("-hmac96"), |
| "-hmac96")) { |
| p = strstr(decode, "-hmac96"); |
| *p = '\0'; |
| authlen = 12; |
| } |
| if (strlen(decode) > strlen("-cbc") && |
| !strcmp(decode + strlen(decode) - strlen("-cbc"), "-cbc")) { |
| p = strstr(decode, "-cbc"); |
| *p = '\0'; |
| } |
| evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname(decode); |
| |
| if (!evp) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "failed to find cipher algo %s\n", decode); |
| sa->evp = NULL; |
| sa->authlen = 0; |
| sa->ivlen = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| sa->evp = evp; |
| sa->authlen = authlen; |
| /* This returns an int, but it should never be negative */ |
| sa->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp); |
| |
| colon++; |
| if (colon[0] == '0' && colon[1] == 'x') { |
| /* decode some hex! */ |
| |
| colon += 2; |
| sa->secretlen = espprint_decode_hex(ndo, sa->secret, sizeof(sa->secret), colon); |
| if(sa->secretlen == 0) return 0; |
| } else { |
| i = strlen(colon); |
| |
| if (i < sizeof(sa->secret)) { |
| memcpy(sa->secret, colon, i); |
| sa->secretlen = i; |
| } else { |
| memcpy(sa->secret, colon, sizeof(sa->secret)); |
| sa->secretlen = sizeof(sa->secret); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION |
| |
| /* |
| * for the moment, ignore the auth algorithm, just hard code the authenticator |
| * length. Need to research how openssl looks up HMAC stuff. |
| */ |
| static int |
| espprint_decode_authalgo(netdissect_options *ndo, |
| char *decode, struct sa_list *sa) |
| { |
| char *colon; |
| |
| colon = strchr(decode, ':'); |
| if (colon == NULL) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "failed to decode espsecret: %s\n", decode); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *colon = '\0'; |
| |
| if(ascii_strcasecmp(decode,"sha1") == 0 || |
| ascii_strcasecmp(decode,"md5") == 0) { |
| sa->authlen = 12; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void esp_print_decode_ikeline(netdissect_options *ndo, char *line, |
| const char *file, int lineno) |
| { |
| /* it's an IKEv2 secret, store it instead */ |
| struct sa_list sa1; |
| |
| char *init; |
| char *icookie, *rcookie; |
| int ilen, rlen; |
| char *authkey; |
| char *enckey; |
| |
| init = strsep(&line, " \t"); |
| icookie = strsep(&line, " \t"); |
| rcookie = strsep(&line, " \t"); |
| authkey = strsep(&line, " \t"); |
| enckey = strsep(&line, " \t"); |
| |
| /* if any fields are missing */ |
| if(!init || !icookie || !rcookie || !authkey || !enckey) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: failed to find all fields for ikev2 at %s:%u", |
| file, lineno); |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| ilen = strlen(icookie); |
| rlen = strlen(rcookie); |
| |
| if((init[0]!='I' && init[0]!='R') |
| || icookie[0]!='0' || icookie[1]!='x' |
| || rcookie[0]!='0' || rcookie[1]!='x' |
| || ilen!=18 |
| || rlen!=18) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: line %s:%u improperly formatted.", |
| file, lineno); |
| |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "init=%s icookie=%s(%u) rcookie=%s(%u)", |
| init, icookie, ilen, rcookie, rlen); |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| sa1.spi = 0; |
| sa1.initiator = (init[0] == 'I'); |
| if(espprint_decode_hex(ndo, sa1.spii, sizeof(sa1.spii), icookie+2)!=8) |
| return; |
| |
| if(espprint_decode_hex(ndo, sa1.spir, sizeof(sa1.spir), rcookie+2)!=8) |
| return; |
| |
| if(!espprint_decode_encalgo(ndo, enckey, &sa1)) return; |
| |
| if(!espprint_decode_authalgo(ndo, authkey, &sa1)) return; |
| |
| esp_print_addsa(ndo, &sa1, FALSE); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * |
| * special form: file /name |
| * causes us to go read from this file instead. |
| * |
| */ |
| static void esp_print_decode_onesecret(netdissect_options *ndo, char *line, |
| const char *file, int lineno) |
| { |
| struct sa_list sa1; |
| int sa_def; |
| |
| char *spikey; |
| char *decode; |
| |
| spikey = strsep(&line, " \t"); |
| sa_def = 0; |
| memset(&sa1, 0, sizeof(struct sa_list)); |
| |
| /* if there is only one token, then it is an algo:key token */ |
| if (line == NULL) { |
| decode = spikey; |
| spikey = NULL; |
| /* sa1.daddr.version = 0; */ |
| /* memset(&sa1.daddr, 0, sizeof(sa1.daddr)); */ |
| /* sa1.spi = 0; */ |
| sa_def = 1; |
| } else |
| decode = line; |
| |
| if (spikey && ascii_strcasecmp(spikey, "file") == 0) { |
| /* open file and read it */ |
| FILE *secretfile; |
| char fileline[1024]; |
| int subfile_lineno=0; |
| char *nl; |
| char *filename = line; |
| |
| secretfile = fopen(filename, FOPEN_READ_TXT); |
| if (secretfile == NULL) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_OPEN_FILE, |
| "%s: can't open %s: %s\n", |
| __func__, filename, strerror(errno)); |
| } |
| |
| while (fgets(fileline, sizeof(fileline)-1, secretfile) != NULL) { |
| subfile_lineno++; |
| /* remove newline from the line */ |
| nl = strchr(fileline, '\n'); |
| if (nl) |
| *nl = '\0'; |
| if (fileline[0] == '#') continue; |
| if (fileline[0] == '\0') continue; |
| |
| esp_print_decode_onesecret(ndo, fileline, filename, subfile_lineno); |
| } |
| fclose(secretfile); |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (spikey && ascii_strcasecmp(spikey, "ikev2") == 0) { |
| esp_print_decode_ikeline(ndo, line, file, lineno); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (spikey) { |
| |
| char *spistr, *foo; |
| uint32_t spino; |
| |
| spistr = strsep(&spikey, "@"); |
| if (spistr == NULL) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: failed to find the @ token"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| spino = strtoul(spistr, &foo, 0); |
| if (spistr == foo || !spikey) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: failed to decode spi# %s\n", foo); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| sa1.spi = spino; |
| |
| if (strtoaddr6(spikey, &sa1.daddr.in6) == 1) { |
| sa1.daddr_version = 6; |
| } else if (strtoaddr(spikey, &sa1.daddr.in4) == 1) { |
| sa1.daddr_version = 4; |
| } else { |
| (*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: can not decode IP# %s\n", spikey); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (decode) { |
| /* skip any blank spaces */ |
| while (*decode == ' ' || *decode == '\t' || *decode == '\r' || *decode == '\n') |
| decode++; |
| |
| if(!espprint_decode_encalgo(ndo, decode, &sa1)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| esp_print_addsa(ndo, &sa1, sa_def); |
| } |
| |
| DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION |
| static void esp_init(netdissect_options *ndo _U_) |
| { |
| /* |
| * 0.9.6 doesn't appear to define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, so |
| * we check whether it's undefined or it's less than the |
| * value for 1.1.0. |
| */ |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT) || OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L |
| OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); |
| #endif |
| EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc, "3des"); |
| } |
| DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION |
| |
| void esp_decodesecret_print(netdissect_options *ndo) |
| { |
| char *line; |
| char *p; |
| static int initialized = 0; |
| |
| if (!initialized) { |
| esp_init(ndo); |
| initialized = 1; |
| } |
| |
| p = ndo->ndo_espsecret; |
| |
| while (p && p[0] != '\0') { |
| /* pick out the first line or first thing until a comma */ |
| if ((line = strsep(&p, "\n,")) == NULL) { |
| line = p; |
| p = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| esp_print_decode_onesecret(ndo, line, "cmdline", 0); |
| } |
| |
| ndo->ndo_espsecret = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| #define USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO |
| #else |
| #define USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO _U_ |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION |
| #endif |
| void |
| esp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, |
| const u_char *bp, u_int length, |
| const u_char *bp2 USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO, |
| u_int ver USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO, |
| int fragmented USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO, |
| u_int ttl_hl USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO) |
| { |
| const struct newesp *esp; |
| const u_char *ep; |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| const struct ip *ip; |
| struct sa_list *sa = NULL; |
| const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL; |
| const u_char *iv; |
| u_int ivlen; |
| u_int payloadlen; |
| const u_char *ct; |
| u_char *pt; |
| u_int padlen; |
| u_int nh; |
| #endif |
| |
| ndo->ndo_protocol = "esp"; |
| esp = (const struct newesp *)bp; |
| |
| /* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */ |
| ep = ndo->ndo_snapend; |
| |
| if ((const u_char *)(esp + 1) >= ep) { |
| nd_print_trunc(ndo); |
| return; |
| } |
| ND_PRINT("ESP(spi=0x%08x", GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_spi)); |
| ND_PRINT(",seq=0x%x)", GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_seq)); |
| ND_PRINT(", length %u", length); |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| /* initialize SAs */ |
| if (ndo->ndo_sa_list_head == NULL) { |
| if (!ndo->ndo_espsecret) |
| return; |
| |
| esp_decodesecret_print(ndo); |
| } |
| |
| if (ndo->ndo_sa_list_head == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| ip = (const struct ip *)bp2; |
| switch (ver) { |
| case 6: |
| ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2; |
| /* we do not attempt to decrypt jumbograms */ |
| if (!GET_BE_U_2(ip6->ip6_plen)) |
| return; |
| /* XXX - check whether it's fragmented? */ |
| /* if we can't get nexthdr, we do not need to decrypt it */ |
| |
| /* see if we can find the SA, and if so, decode it */ |
| for (sa = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; sa != NULL; sa = sa->next) { |
| if (sa->spi == GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_spi) && |
| sa->daddr_version == 6 && |
| UNALIGNED_MEMCMP(&sa->daddr.in6, &ip6->ip6_dst, |
| sizeof(nd_ipv6)) == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case 4: |
| /* nexthdr & padding are in the last fragment */ |
| if (fragmented) |
| return; |
| |
| /* see if we can find the SA, and if so, decode it */ |
| for (sa = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; sa != NULL; sa = sa->next) { |
| if (sa->spi == GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_spi) && |
| sa->daddr_version == 4 && |
| UNALIGNED_MEMCMP(&sa->daddr.in4, &ip->ip_dst, |
| sizeof(nd_ipv4)) == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* if we didn't find the specific one, then look for |
| * an unspecified one. |
| */ |
| if (sa == NULL) |
| sa = ndo->ndo_sa_default; |
| |
| /* if not found fail */ |
| if (sa == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| /* pointer to the IV, if there is one */ |
| iv = (const u_char *)(esp + 1) + 0; |
| /* length of the IV, if there is one; 0, if there isn't */ |
| ivlen = sa->ivlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Get a pointer to the ciphertext. |
| * |
| * p points to the beginning of the payload, i.e. to the |
| * initialization vector, so if we skip past the initialization |
| * vector, it points to the beginning of the ciphertext. |
| */ |
| ct = iv + ivlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Make sure the authentication data/integrity check value length |
| * isn't bigger than the total amount of data available after |
| * the ESP header and initialization vector is removed and, |
| * if not, slice the authentication data/ICV off. |
| */ |
| if (ep - ct < sa->authlen) { |
| nd_print_trunc(ndo); |
| return; |
| } |
| ep = ep - sa->authlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the length of the ciphertext. ep points to |
| * the beginning of the authentication data/integrity check |
| * value, i.e. right past the end of the ciphertext; |
| */ |
| payloadlen = ep - ct; |
| |
| if (sa->evp == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * If the next header value is past the end of the available |
| * data, we won't be able to fetch it once we've decrypted |
| * the ciphertext, so there's no point in decrypting the data. |
| * |
| * Report it as truncation. |
| */ |
| if (!ND_TTEST_1(ep - 1)) { |
| nd_print_trunc(ndo); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| pt = do_decrypt(ndo, __func__, sa, iv, ct, payloadlen); |
| if (pt == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * Switch to the output buffer for dissection, and |
| * save it on the buffer stack so it can be freed. |
| */ |
| if (!nd_push_buffer(ndo, pt, pt, payloadlen)) { |
| free(pt); |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC, |
| "%s: can't push buffer on buffer stack", __func__); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Sanity check for pad length; if it, plus 2 for the pad |
| * length and next header fields, is bigger than the ciphertext |
| * length (which is also the plaintext length), it's too big. |
| * |
| * XXX - the check can fail if the packet is corrupt *or* if |
| * it was not decrypted with the correct key, so that the |
| * "plaintext" is not what was being sent. |
| */ |
| padlen = GET_U_1(pt + payloadlen - 2); |
| if (padlen + 2 > payloadlen) { |
| nd_print_trunc(ndo); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* Get the next header */ |
| nh = GET_U_1(pt + payloadlen - 1); |
| |
| ND_PRINT(": "); |
| |
| /* |
| * Don't put padding + padding length(1 byte) + next header(1 byte) |
| * in the buffer because they are not part of the plaintext to decode. |
| */ |
| if (!nd_push_snaplen(ndo, pt, payloadlen - (padlen + 2))) { |
| (*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC, |
| "%s: can't push snaplen on buffer stack", __func__); |
| } |
| |
| /* Now dissect the plaintext. */ |
| ip_demux_print(ndo, pt, payloadlen - (padlen + 2), ver, fragmented, |
| ttl_hl, nh, bp2); |
| |
| /* Pop the buffer, freeing it. */ |
| nd_pop_packet_info(ndo); |
| /* Pop the nd_push_snaplen */ |
| nd_pop_packet_info(ndo); |
| #endif |
| } |
| #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO |
| DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION |
| #endif |