| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
| // found in the LICENSE file. | |
| #include "update_engine/delta_performer.h" | |
| #include <endian.h> | |
| #include <errno.h> | |
| #include <algorithm> | |
| #include <cstring> | |
| #include <memory> | |
| #include <string> | |
| #include <vector> | |
| #include <base/files/file_util.h> | |
| #include <base/format_macros.h> | |
| #include <base/strings/string_util.h> | |
| #include <base/strings/stringprintf.h> | |
| #include <google/protobuf/repeated_field.h> | |
| #include "update_engine/bzip_extent_writer.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/constants.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/extent_ranges.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/extent_writer.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/hardware_interface.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/payload_constants.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/payload_state_interface.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/payload_verifier.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/prefs_interface.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/subprocess.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/terminator.h" | |
| #include "update_engine/update_attempter.h" | |
| using google::protobuf::RepeatedPtrField; | |
| using std::min; | |
| using std::string; | |
| using std::unique_ptr; | |
| using std::vector; | |
| namespace chromeos_update_engine { | |
| const uint64_t DeltaPerformer::kDeltaVersionSize = 8; | |
| const uint64_t DeltaPerformer::kDeltaManifestSizeSize = 8; | |
| const uint64_t DeltaPerformer::kSupportedMajorPayloadVersion = 1; | |
| const uint64_t DeltaPerformer::kSupportedMinorPayloadVersion = 1; | |
| const uint64_t DeltaPerformer::kFullPayloadMinorVersion = 0; | |
| const char DeltaPerformer::kUpdatePayloadPublicKeyPath[] = | |
| "/usr/share/update_engine/update-payload-key.pub.pem"; | |
| const unsigned DeltaPerformer::kProgressLogMaxChunks = 10; | |
| const unsigned DeltaPerformer::kProgressLogTimeoutSeconds = 30; | |
| const unsigned DeltaPerformer::kProgressDownloadWeight = 50; | |
| const unsigned DeltaPerformer::kProgressOperationsWeight = 50; | |
| namespace { | |
| const int kUpdateStateOperationInvalid = -1; | |
| const int kMaxResumedUpdateFailures = 10; | |
| // Opens path for read/write, put the fd into *fd. On success returns true | |
| // and sets *err to 0. On failure, returns false and sets *err to errno. | |
| bool OpenFile(const char* path, int* fd, int* err) { | |
| if (*fd != -1) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Can't open(" << path << "), *fd != -1 (it's " << *fd << ")"; | |
| *err = EINVAL; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| *fd = open(path, O_RDWR, 000); | |
| if (*fd < 0) { | |
| *err = errno; | |
| PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open file " << path; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| *err = 0; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| } // namespace | |
| // Computes the ratio of |part| and |total|, scaled to |norm|, using integer | |
| // arithmetic. | |
| static uint64_t IntRatio(uint64_t part, uint64_t total, uint64_t norm) { | |
| return part * norm / total; | |
| } | |
| void DeltaPerformer::LogProgress(const char* message_prefix) { | |
| // Format operations total count and percentage. | |
| string total_operations_str("?"); | |
| string completed_percentage_str(""); | |
| if (num_total_operations_) { | |
| total_operations_str = base::StringPrintf("%zu", num_total_operations_); | |
| // Upcasting to 64-bit to avoid overflow, back to size_t for formatting. | |
| completed_percentage_str = | |
| base::StringPrintf(" (%" PRIu64 "%%)", | |
| IntRatio(next_operation_num_, num_total_operations_, | |
| 100)); | |
| } | |
| // Format download total count and percentage. | |
| size_t payload_size = install_plan_->payload_size; | |
| string payload_size_str("?"); | |
| string downloaded_percentage_str(""); | |
| if (payload_size) { | |
| payload_size_str = base::StringPrintf("%zu", payload_size); | |
| // Upcasting to 64-bit to avoid overflow, back to size_t for formatting. | |
| downloaded_percentage_str = | |
| base::StringPrintf(" (%" PRIu64 "%%)", | |
| IntRatio(total_bytes_received_, payload_size, 100)); | |
| } | |
| LOG(INFO) << (message_prefix ? message_prefix : "") << next_operation_num_ | |
| << "/" << total_operations_str << " operations" | |
| << completed_percentage_str << ", " << total_bytes_received_ | |
| << "/" << payload_size_str << " bytes downloaded" | |
| << downloaded_percentage_str << ", overall progress " | |
| << overall_progress_ << "%"; | |
| } | |
| void DeltaPerformer::UpdateOverallProgress(bool force_log, | |
| const char* message_prefix) { | |
| // Compute our download and overall progress. | |
| unsigned new_overall_progress = 0; | |
| COMPILE_ASSERT(kProgressDownloadWeight + kProgressOperationsWeight == 100, | |
| progress_weight_dont_add_up); | |
| // Only consider download progress if its total size is known; otherwise | |
| // adjust the operations weight to compensate for the absence of download | |
| // progress. Also, make sure to cap the download portion at | |
| // kProgressDownloadWeight, in case we end up downloading more than we | |
| // initially expected (this indicates a problem, but could generally happen). | |
| // TODO(garnold) the correction of operations weight when we do not have the | |
| // total payload size, as well as the conditional guard below, should both be | |
| // eliminated once we ensure that the payload_size in the install plan is | |
| // always given and is non-zero. This currently isn't the case during unit | |
| // tests (see chromium-os:37969). | |
| size_t payload_size = install_plan_->payload_size; | |
| unsigned actual_operations_weight = kProgressOperationsWeight; | |
| if (payload_size) | |
| new_overall_progress += min( | |
| static_cast<unsigned>(IntRatio(total_bytes_received_, payload_size, | |
| kProgressDownloadWeight)), | |
| kProgressDownloadWeight); | |
| else | |
| actual_operations_weight += kProgressDownloadWeight; | |
| // Only add completed operations if their total number is known; we definitely | |
| // expect an update to have at least one operation, so the expectation is that | |
| // this will eventually reach |actual_operations_weight|. | |
| if (num_total_operations_) | |
| new_overall_progress += IntRatio(next_operation_num_, num_total_operations_, | |
| actual_operations_weight); | |
| // Progress ratio cannot recede, unless our assumptions about the total | |
| // payload size, total number of operations, or the monotonicity of progress | |
| // is breached. | |
| if (new_overall_progress < overall_progress_) { | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "progress counter receded from " << overall_progress_ | |
| << "% down to " << new_overall_progress << "%; this is a bug"; | |
| force_log = true; | |
| } | |
| overall_progress_ = new_overall_progress; | |
| // Update chunk index, log as needed: if forced by called, or we completed a | |
| // progress chunk, or a timeout has expired. | |
| base::Time curr_time = base::Time::Now(); | |
| unsigned curr_progress_chunk = | |
| overall_progress_ * kProgressLogMaxChunks / 100; | |
| if (force_log || curr_progress_chunk > last_progress_chunk_ || | |
| curr_time > forced_progress_log_time_) { | |
| forced_progress_log_time_ = curr_time + forced_progress_log_wait_; | |
| LogProgress(message_prefix); | |
| } | |
| last_progress_chunk_ = curr_progress_chunk; | |
| } | |
| size_t DeltaPerformer::CopyDataToBuffer(const char** bytes_p, size_t* count_p, | |
| size_t max) { | |
| const size_t count = *count_p; | |
| if (!count) | |
| return 0; // Special case shortcut. | |
| size_t read_len = std::min(count, max - buffer_.size()); | |
| const char* bytes_start = *bytes_p; | |
| const char* bytes_end = bytes_start + read_len; | |
| buffer_.insert(buffer_.end(), bytes_start, bytes_end); | |
| *bytes_p = bytes_end; | |
| *count_p = count - read_len; | |
| return read_len; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::HandleOpResult(bool op_result, const char* op_type_name, | |
| ErrorCode* error) { | |
| if (op_result) | |
| return true; | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to perform " << op_type_name << " operation " | |
| << next_operation_num_; | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kDownloadOperationExecutionError; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Returns true if |op| is idempotent -- i.e., if we can interrupt it and repeat | |
| // it safely. Returns false otherwise. | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::IsIdempotentOperation( | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& op) { | |
| if (op.src_extents_size() == 0) { | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| // When in doubt, it's safe to declare an op non-idempotent. Note that we | |
| // could detect other types of idempotent operations here such as a MOVE that | |
| // moves blocks onto themselves. However, we rely on the server to not send | |
| // such operations at all. | |
| ExtentRanges src_ranges; | |
| src_ranges.AddRepeatedExtents(op.src_extents()); | |
| const uint64_t block_count = src_ranges.blocks(); | |
| src_ranges.SubtractRepeatedExtents(op.dst_extents()); | |
| return block_count == src_ranges.blocks(); | |
| } | |
| int DeltaPerformer::Open(const char* path, int flags, mode_t mode) { | |
| int err; | |
| if (OpenFile(path, &fd_, &err)) | |
| path_ = path; | |
| return -err; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::OpenKernel(const char* kernel_path) { | |
| int err; | |
| bool success = OpenFile(kernel_path, &kernel_fd_, &err); | |
| if (success) | |
| kernel_path_ = kernel_path; | |
| return success; | |
| } | |
| int DeltaPerformer::Close() { | |
| int err = 0; | |
| if (close(kernel_fd_) == -1) { | |
| err = errno; | |
| PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to close kernel fd:"; | |
| } | |
| if (close(fd_) == -1) { | |
| err = errno; | |
| PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to close rootfs fd:"; | |
| } | |
| LOG_IF(ERROR, !hash_calculator_.Finalize()) << "Unable to finalize the hash."; | |
| fd_ = -2; // Set to invalid so that calls to Open() will fail. | |
| path_ = ""; | |
| if (!buffer_.empty()) { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Discarding " << buffer_.size() << " unused downloaded bytes"; | |
| if (err >= 0) | |
| err = 1; | |
| } | |
| return -err; | |
| } | |
| namespace { | |
| void LogPartitionInfoHash(const PartitionInfo& info, const string& tag) { | |
| string sha256; | |
| if (OmahaHashCalculator::Base64Encode(info.hash().data(), | |
| info.hash().size(), | |
| &sha256)) { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "PartitionInfo " << tag << " sha256: " << sha256 | |
| << " size: " << info.size(); | |
| } else { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Base64Encode failed for tag: " << tag; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| void LogPartitionInfo(const DeltaArchiveManifest& manifest) { | |
| if (manifest.has_old_kernel_info()) | |
| LogPartitionInfoHash(manifest.old_kernel_info(), "old_kernel_info"); | |
| if (manifest.has_old_rootfs_info()) | |
| LogPartitionInfoHash(manifest.old_rootfs_info(), "old_rootfs_info"); | |
| if (manifest.has_new_kernel_info()) | |
| LogPartitionInfoHash(manifest.new_kernel_info(), "new_kernel_info"); | |
| if (manifest.has_new_rootfs_info()) | |
| LogPartitionInfoHash(manifest.new_rootfs_info(), "new_rootfs_info"); | |
| } | |
| } // namespace | |
| uint64_t DeltaPerformer::GetVersionOffset() { | |
| // Manifest size is stored right after the magic string and the version. | |
| return strlen(kDeltaMagic); | |
| } | |
| uint64_t DeltaPerformer::GetManifestSizeOffset() { | |
| // Manifest size is stored right after the magic string and the version. | |
| return strlen(kDeltaMagic) + kDeltaVersionSize; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t DeltaPerformer::GetManifestOffset() { | |
| // Actual manifest begins right after the manifest size field. | |
| return GetManifestSizeOffset() + kDeltaManifestSizeSize; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t DeltaPerformer::GetMetadataSize() const { | |
| return metadata_size_; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::GetManifest(DeltaArchiveManifest* out_manifest_p) const { | |
| if (!manifest_parsed_) | |
| return false; | |
| *out_manifest_p = manifest_; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| DeltaPerformer::MetadataParseResult DeltaPerformer::ParsePayloadMetadata( | |
| const std::vector<char>& payload, | |
| ErrorCode* error) { | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| const uint64_t manifest_offset = GetManifestOffset(); | |
| uint64_t manifest_size = (metadata_size_ ? | |
| metadata_size_ - manifest_offset : 0); | |
| if (!manifest_size) { | |
| // Ensure we have data to cover the payload header. | |
| if (payload.size() < manifest_offset) | |
| return kMetadataParseInsufficientData; | |
| // Validate the magic string. | |
| if (memcmp(payload.data(), kDeltaMagic, strlen(kDeltaMagic)) != 0) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Bad payload format -- invalid delta magic."; | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kDownloadInvalidMetadataMagicString; | |
| return kMetadataParseError; | |
| } | |
| // Extract the payload version from the metadata. | |
| uint64_t major_payload_version; | |
| COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(major_payload_version) == kDeltaVersionSize, | |
| major_payload_version_size_mismatch); | |
| memcpy(&major_payload_version, | |
| &payload[GetVersionOffset()], | |
| kDeltaVersionSize); | |
| // switch big endian to host | |
| major_payload_version = be64toh(major_payload_version); | |
| if (major_payload_version != kSupportedMajorPayloadVersion) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Bad payload format -- unsupported payload version: " | |
| << major_payload_version; | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kUnsupportedMajorPayloadVersion; | |
| return kMetadataParseError; | |
| } | |
| // Next, parse the manifest size. | |
| COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(manifest_size) == kDeltaManifestSizeSize, | |
| manifest_size_size_mismatch); | |
| memcpy(&manifest_size, | |
| &payload[GetManifestSizeOffset()], | |
| kDeltaManifestSizeSize); | |
| manifest_size = be64toh(manifest_size); // switch big endian to host | |
| // If the metadata size is present in install plan, check for it immediately | |
| // even before waiting for that many number of bytes to be downloaded in the | |
| // payload. This will prevent any attack which relies on us downloading data | |
| // beyond the expected metadata size. | |
| metadata_size_ = manifest_offset + manifest_size; | |
| if (install_plan_->hash_checks_mandatory) { | |
| if (install_plan_->metadata_size != metadata_size_) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mandatory metadata size in Omaha response (" | |
| << install_plan_->metadata_size | |
| << ") is missing/incorrect, actual = " << metadata_size_; | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kDownloadInvalidMetadataSize; | |
| return kMetadataParseError; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Now that we have validated the metadata size, we should wait for the full | |
| // metadata to be read in before we can parse it. | |
| if (payload.size() < metadata_size_) | |
| return kMetadataParseInsufficientData; | |
| // Log whether we validated the size or simply trusting what's in the payload | |
| // here. This is logged here (after we received the full metadata data) so | |
| // that we just log once (instead of logging n times) if it takes n | |
| // DeltaPerformer::Write calls to download the full manifest. | |
| if (install_plan_->metadata_size == metadata_size_) { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Manifest size in payload matches expected value from Omaha"; | |
| } else { | |
| // For mandatory-cases, we'd have already returned a kMetadataParseError | |
| // above. We'll be here only for non-mandatory cases. Just send a UMA stat. | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Ignoring missing/incorrect metadata size (" | |
| << install_plan_->metadata_size | |
| << ") in Omaha response as validation is not mandatory. " | |
| << "Trusting metadata size in payload = " << metadata_size_; | |
| SendUmaStat(ErrorCode::kDownloadInvalidMetadataSize); | |
| } | |
| // We have the full metadata in |payload|. Verify its integrity | |
| // and authenticity based on the information we have in Omaha response. | |
| *error = ValidateMetadataSignature(&payload[0], metadata_size_); | |
| if (*error != ErrorCode::kSuccess) { | |
| if (install_plan_->hash_checks_mandatory) { | |
| // The autoupdate_CatchBadSignatures test checks for this string | |
| // in log-files. Keep in sync. | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mandatory metadata signature validation failed"; | |
| return kMetadataParseError; | |
| } | |
| // For non-mandatory cases, just send a UMA stat. | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Ignoring metadata signature validation failures"; | |
| SendUmaStat(*error); | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| // The payload metadata is deemed valid, it's safe to parse the protobuf. | |
| if (!manifest_.ParseFromArray(&payload[manifest_offset], manifest_size)) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse manifest in update file."; | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kDownloadManifestParseError; | |
| return kMetadataParseError; | |
| } | |
| manifest_parsed_ = true; | |
| return kMetadataParseSuccess; | |
| } | |
| // Wrapper around write. Returns true if all requested bytes | |
| // were written, or false on any error, regardless of progress | |
| // and stores an action exit code in |error|. | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::Write(const void* bytes, size_t count, | |
| ErrorCode *error) { | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| const char* c_bytes = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(bytes); | |
| system_state_->payload_state()->DownloadProgress(count); | |
| // Update the total byte downloaded count and the progress logs. | |
| total_bytes_received_ += count; | |
| UpdateOverallProgress(false, "Completed "); | |
| while (!manifest_valid_) { | |
| // Read data up to the needed limit; this is either the payload header size, | |
| // or the full metadata size (once it becomes known). | |
| const bool do_read_header = !metadata_size_; | |
| CopyDataToBuffer(&c_bytes, &count, | |
| (do_read_header ? GetManifestOffset() : | |
| metadata_size_)); | |
| MetadataParseResult result = ParsePayloadMetadata(buffer_, error); | |
| if (result == kMetadataParseError) | |
| return false; | |
| if (result == kMetadataParseInsufficientData) { | |
| // If we just processed the header, make an attempt on the manifest. | |
| if (do_read_header && metadata_size_) | |
| continue; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| // Checks the integrity of the payload manifest. | |
| if ((*error = ValidateManifest()) != ErrorCode::kSuccess) | |
| return false; | |
| manifest_valid_ = true; | |
| // Clear the download buffer. | |
| DiscardBuffer(false); | |
| LOG_IF(WARNING, !prefs_->SetInt64(kPrefsManifestMetadataSize, | |
| metadata_size_)) | |
| << "Unable to save the manifest metadata size."; | |
| LogPartitionInfo(manifest_); | |
| if (!PrimeUpdateState()) { | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kDownloadStateInitializationError; | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to prime the update state."; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| num_rootfs_operations_ = manifest_.install_operations_size(); | |
| num_total_operations_ = | |
| num_rootfs_operations_ + manifest_.kernel_install_operations_size(); | |
| if (next_operation_num_ > 0) | |
| UpdateOverallProgress(true, "Resuming after "); | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Starting to apply update payload operations"; | |
| } | |
| while (next_operation_num_ < num_total_operations_) { | |
| // Check if we should cancel the current attempt for any reason. | |
| // In this case, *error will have already been populated with the reason | |
| // why we're cancelling. | |
| if (system_state_->update_attempter()->ShouldCancel(error)) | |
| return false; | |
| const bool is_kernel_partition = | |
| (next_operation_num_ >= num_rootfs_operations_); | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation &op = | |
| is_kernel_partition ? | |
| manifest_.kernel_install_operations( | |
| next_operation_num_ - num_rootfs_operations_) : | |
| manifest_.install_operations(next_operation_num_); | |
| CopyDataToBuffer(&c_bytes, &count, op.data_length()); | |
| // Check whether we received all of the next operation's data payload. | |
| if (!CanPerformInstallOperation(op)) | |
| return true; | |
| // Validate the operation only if the metadata signature is present. | |
| // Otherwise, keep the old behavior. This serves as a knob to disable | |
| // the validation logic in case we find some regression after rollout. | |
| // NOTE: If hash checks are mandatory and if metadata_signature is empty, | |
| // we would have already failed in ParsePayloadMetadata method and thus not | |
| // even be here. So no need to handle that case again here. | |
| if (!install_plan_->metadata_signature.empty()) { | |
| // Note: Validate must be called only if CanPerformInstallOperation is | |
| // called. Otherwise, we might be failing operations before even if there | |
| // isn't sufficient data to compute the proper hash. | |
| *error = ValidateOperationHash(op); | |
| if (*error != ErrorCode::kSuccess) { | |
| if (install_plan_->hash_checks_mandatory) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Mandatory operation hash check failed"; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // For non-mandatory cases, just send a UMA stat. | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Ignoring operation validation errors"; | |
| SendUmaStat(*error); | |
| *error = ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Makes sure we unblock exit when this operation completes. | |
| ScopedTerminatorExitUnblocker exit_unblocker = | |
| ScopedTerminatorExitUnblocker(); // Avoids a compiler unused var bug. | |
| bool op_result; | |
| if (op.type() == DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE || | |
| op.type() == DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE_BZ) | |
| op_result = HandleOpResult( | |
| PerformReplaceOperation(op, is_kernel_partition), "replace", error); | |
| else if (op.type() == DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_MOVE) | |
| op_result = HandleOpResult( | |
| PerformMoveOperation(op, is_kernel_partition), "move", error); | |
| else if (op.type() == DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_BSDIFF) | |
| op_result = HandleOpResult( | |
| PerformBsdiffOperation(op, is_kernel_partition), "bsdiff", error); | |
| else | |
| op_result = HandleOpResult(false, "unknown", error); | |
| if (!op_result) | |
| return false; | |
| next_operation_num_++; | |
| UpdateOverallProgress(false, "Completed "); | |
| CheckpointUpdateProgress(); | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::IsManifestValid() { | |
| return manifest_valid_; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::CanPerformInstallOperation( | |
| const chromeos_update_engine::DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& | |
| operation) { | |
| // Move operations don't require any data blob, so they can always | |
| // be performed | |
| if (operation.type() == DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_MOVE) | |
| return true; | |
| // See if we have the entire data blob in the buffer | |
| if (operation.data_offset() < buffer_offset_) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "we threw away data it seems?"; | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| return (operation.data_offset() + operation.data_length() <= | |
| buffer_offset_ + buffer_.size()); | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::PerformReplaceOperation( | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& operation, | |
| bool is_kernel_partition) { | |
| CHECK(operation.type() == \ | |
| DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE || \ | |
| operation.type() == \ | |
| DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE_BZ); | |
| // Since we delete data off the beginning of the buffer as we use it, | |
| // the data we need should be exactly at the beginning of the buffer. | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(buffer_offset_ == operation.data_offset()); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(buffer_.size() >= operation.data_length()); | |
| // Extract the signature message if it's in this operation. | |
| ExtractSignatureMessage(operation); | |
| DirectExtentWriter direct_writer; | |
| ZeroPadExtentWriter zero_pad_writer(&direct_writer); | |
| unique_ptr<BzipExtentWriter> bzip_writer; | |
| // Since bzip decompression is optional, we have a variable writer that will | |
| // point to one of the ExtentWriter objects above. | |
| ExtentWriter* writer = nullptr; | |
| if (operation.type() == DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE) { | |
| writer = &zero_pad_writer; | |
| } else if (operation.type() == | |
| DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE_BZ) { | |
| bzip_writer.reset(new BzipExtentWriter(&zero_pad_writer)); | |
| writer = bzip_writer.get(); | |
| } else { | |
| NOTREACHED(); | |
| } | |
| // Create a vector of extents to pass to the ExtentWriter. | |
| vector<Extent> extents; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < operation.dst_extents_size(); i++) { | |
| extents.push_back(operation.dst_extents(i)); | |
| } | |
| int fd = is_kernel_partition ? kernel_fd_ : fd_; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(writer->Init(fd, extents, block_size_)); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(writer->Write(&buffer_[0], operation.data_length())); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(writer->End()); | |
| // Update buffer | |
| DiscardBuffer(true); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::PerformMoveOperation( | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& operation, | |
| bool is_kernel_partition) { | |
| // Calculate buffer size. Note, this function doesn't do a sliding | |
| // window to copy in case the source and destination blocks overlap. | |
| // If we wanted to do a sliding window, we could program the server | |
| // to generate deltas that effectively did a sliding window. | |
| uint64_t blocks_to_read = 0; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < operation.src_extents_size(); i++) | |
| blocks_to_read += operation.src_extents(i).num_blocks(); | |
| uint64_t blocks_to_write = 0; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < operation.dst_extents_size(); i++) | |
| blocks_to_write += operation.dst_extents(i).num_blocks(); | |
| DCHECK_EQ(blocks_to_write, blocks_to_read); | |
| vector<char> buf(blocks_to_write * block_size_); | |
| int fd = is_kernel_partition ? kernel_fd_ : fd_; | |
| // Read in bytes. | |
| ssize_t bytes_read = 0; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < operation.src_extents_size(); i++) { | |
| ssize_t bytes_read_this_iteration = 0; | |
| const Extent& extent = operation.src_extents(i); | |
| const size_t bytes = extent.num_blocks() * block_size_; | |
| if (extent.start_block() == kSparseHole) { | |
| bytes_read_this_iteration = bytes; | |
| memset(&buf[bytes_read], 0, bytes); | |
| } else { | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(utils::PReadAll(fd, | |
| &buf[bytes_read], | |
| bytes, | |
| extent.start_block() * block_size_, | |
| &bytes_read_this_iteration)); | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| bytes_read_this_iteration == static_cast<ssize_t>(bytes)); | |
| bytes_read += bytes_read_this_iteration; | |
| } | |
| // If this is a non-idempotent operation, request a delayed exit and clear the | |
| // update state in case the operation gets interrupted. Do this as late as | |
| // possible. | |
| if (!IsIdempotentOperation(operation)) { | |
| Terminator::set_exit_blocked(true); | |
| ResetUpdateProgress(prefs_, true); | |
| } | |
| // Write bytes out. | |
| ssize_t bytes_written = 0; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < operation.dst_extents_size(); i++) { | |
| const Extent& extent = operation.dst_extents(i); | |
| const size_t bytes = extent.num_blocks() * block_size_; | |
| if (extent.start_block() == kSparseHole) { | |
| DCHECK(buf.begin() + bytes_written == | |
| std::search_n(buf.begin() + bytes_written, | |
| buf.begin() + bytes_written + bytes, | |
| bytes, 0)); | |
| } else { | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| utils::PWriteAll(fd, | |
| &buf[bytes_written], | |
| bytes, | |
| extent.start_block() * block_size_)); | |
| } | |
| bytes_written += bytes; | |
| } | |
| DCHECK_EQ(bytes_written, bytes_read); | |
| DCHECK_EQ(bytes_written, static_cast<ssize_t>(buf.size())); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::ExtentsToBsdiffPositionsString( | |
| const RepeatedPtrField<Extent>& extents, | |
| uint64_t block_size, | |
| uint64_t full_length, | |
| string* positions_string) { | |
| string ret; | |
| uint64_t length = 0; | |
| for (int i = 0; i < extents.size(); i++) { | |
| Extent extent = extents.Get(i); | |
| int64_t start = extent.start_block(); | |
| uint64_t this_length = min(full_length - length, | |
| extent.num_blocks() * block_size); | |
| if (start == static_cast<int64_t>(kSparseHole)) | |
| start = -1; | |
| else | |
| start *= block_size; | |
| ret += base::StringPrintf("%" PRIi64 ":%" PRIu64 ",", start, this_length); | |
| length += this_length; | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(length == full_length); | |
| if (!ret.empty()) | |
| ret.resize(ret.size() - 1); // Strip trailing comma off | |
| *positions_string = ret; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::PerformBsdiffOperation( | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& operation, | |
| bool is_kernel_partition) { | |
| // Since we delete data off the beginning of the buffer as we use it, | |
| // the data we need should be exactly at the beginning of the buffer. | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(buffer_offset_ == operation.data_offset()); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(buffer_.size() >= operation.data_length()); | |
| string input_positions; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(ExtentsToBsdiffPositionsString(operation.src_extents(), | |
| block_size_, | |
| operation.src_length(), | |
| &input_positions)); | |
| string output_positions; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(ExtentsToBsdiffPositionsString(operation.dst_extents(), | |
| block_size_, | |
| operation.dst_length(), | |
| &output_positions)); | |
| string temp_filename; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(utils::MakeTempFile("/tmp/au_patch.XXXXXX", | |
| &temp_filename, | |
| nullptr)); | |
| ScopedPathUnlinker path_unlinker(temp_filename); | |
| { | |
| int fd = open(temp_filename.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); | |
| ScopedFdCloser fd_closer(&fd); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| utils::WriteAll(fd, &buffer_[0], operation.data_length())); | |
| } | |
| // Update the buffer to release the patch data memory as soon as the patch | |
| // file is written out. | |
| DiscardBuffer(true); | |
| int fd = is_kernel_partition ? kernel_fd_ : fd_; | |
| const string path = base::StringPrintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); | |
| // If this is a non-idempotent operation, request a delayed exit and clear the | |
| // update state in case the operation gets interrupted. Do this as late as | |
| // possible. | |
| if (!IsIdempotentOperation(operation)) { | |
| Terminator::set_exit_blocked(true); | |
| ResetUpdateProgress(prefs_, true); | |
| } | |
| vector<string> cmd; | |
| cmd.push_back(kBspatchPath); | |
| cmd.push_back(path); | |
| cmd.push_back(path); | |
| cmd.push_back(temp_filename); | |
| cmd.push_back(input_positions); | |
| cmd.push_back(output_positions); | |
| int return_code = 0; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| Subprocess::SynchronousExecFlags(cmd, | |
| G_SPAWN_LEAVE_DESCRIPTORS_OPEN, | |
| &return_code, | |
| nullptr)); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(return_code == 0); | |
| if (operation.dst_length() % block_size_) { | |
| // Zero out rest of final block. | |
| // TODO(adlr): build this into bspatch; it's more efficient that way. | |
| const Extent& last_extent = | |
| operation.dst_extents(operation.dst_extents_size() - 1); | |
| const uint64_t end_byte = | |
| (last_extent.start_block() + last_extent.num_blocks()) * block_size_; | |
| const uint64_t begin_byte = | |
| end_byte - (block_size_ - operation.dst_length() % block_size_); | |
| vector<char> zeros(end_byte - begin_byte); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| utils::PWriteAll(fd, &zeros[0], end_byte - begin_byte, begin_byte)); | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::ExtractSignatureMessage( | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& operation) { | |
| if (operation.type() != DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation_Type_REPLACE || | |
| !manifest_.has_signatures_offset() || | |
| manifest_.signatures_offset() != operation.data_offset()) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(manifest_.has_signatures_size() && | |
| manifest_.signatures_size() == operation.data_length()); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(signatures_message_data_.empty()); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(buffer_offset_ == manifest_.signatures_offset()); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(buffer_.size() >= manifest_.signatures_size()); | |
| signatures_message_data_.assign( | |
| buffer_.begin(), | |
| buffer_.begin() + manifest_.signatures_size()); | |
| // Save the signature blob because if the update is interrupted after the | |
| // download phase we don't go through this path anymore. Some alternatives to | |
| // consider: | |
| // | |
| // 1. On resume, re-download the signature blob from the server and re-verify | |
| // it. | |
| // | |
| // 2. Verify the signature as soon as it's received and don't checkpoint the | |
| // blob and the signed sha-256 context. | |
| LOG_IF(WARNING, !prefs_->SetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSignatureBlob, | |
| string(&signatures_message_data_[0], | |
| signatures_message_data_.size()))) | |
| << "Unable to store the signature blob."; | |
| // The hash of all data consumed so far should be verified against the signed | |
| // hash. | |
| signed_hash_context_ = hash_calculator_.GetContext(); | |
| LOG_IF(WARNING, !prefs_->SetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSignedSHA256Context, | |
| signed_hash_context_)) | |
| << "Unable to store the signed hash context."; | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Extracted signature data of size " | |
| << manifest_.signatures_size() << " at " | |
| << manifest_.signatures_offset(); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::GetPublicKeyFromResponse(base::FilePath *out_tmp_key) { | |
| if (system_state_->hardware()->IsOfficialBuild() || | |
| utils::FileExists(public_key_path_.c_str()) || | |
| install_plan_->public_key_rsa.empty()) | |
| return false; | |
| if (!utils::DecodeAndStoreBase64String(install_plan_->public_key_rsa, | |
| out_tmp_key)) | |
| return false; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| ErrorCode DeltaPerformer::ValidateMetadataSignature( | |
| const char* metadata, uint64_t metadata_size) { | |
| if (install_plan_->metadata_signature.empty()) { | |
| if (install_plan_->hash_checks_mandatory) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Missing mandatory metadata signature in Omaha response"; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureMissingError; | |
| } | |
| // For non-mandatory cases, just send a UMA stat. | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot validate metadata as the signature is empty"; | |
| SendUmaStat(ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureMissingError); | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| // Convert base64-encoded signature to raw bytes. | |
| vector<char> metadata_signature; | |
| if (!OmahaHashCalculator::Base64Decode(install_plan_->metadata_signature, | |
| &metadata_signature)) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to decode base64 metadata signature: " | |
| << install_plan_->metadata_signature; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureError; | |
| } | |
| // See if we should use the public RSA key in the Omaha response. | |
| base::FilePath path_to_public_key(public_key_path_); | |
| base::FilePath tmp_key; | |
| if (GetPublicKeyFromResponse(&tmp_key)) | |
| path_to_public_key = tmp_key; | |
| ScopedPathUnlinker tmp_key_remover(tmp_key.value()); | |
| if (tmp_key.empty()) | |
| tmp_key_remover.set_should_remove(false); | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Verifying metadata hash signature using public key: " | |
| << path_to_public_key.value(); | |
| vector<char> expected_metadata_hash; | |
| if (!PayloadVerifier::GetRawHashFromSignature(metadata_signature, | |
| path_to_public_key.value(), | |
| &expected_metadata_hash)) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to compute expected hash from metadata signature"; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureError; | |
| } | |
| OmahaHashCalculator metadata_hasher; | |
| metadata_hasher.Update(metadata, metadata_size); | |
| if (!metadata_hasher.Finalize()) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to compute actual hash of manifest"; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureVerificationError; | |
| } | |
| vector<char> calculated_metadata_hash = metadata_hasher.raw_hash(); | |
| PayloadVerifier::PadRSA2048SHA256Hash(&calculated_metadata_hash); | |
| if (calculated_metadata_hash.empty()) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Computed actual hash of metadata is empty."; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureVerificationError; | |
| } | |
| if (calculated_metadata_hash != expected_metadata_hash) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Manifest hash verification failed. Expected hash = "; | |
| utils::HexDumpVector(expected_metadata_hash); | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Calculated hash = "; | |
| utils::HexDumpVector(calculated_metadata_hash); | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadMetadataSignatureMismatch; | |
| } | |
| // The autoupdate_CatchBadSignatures test checks for this string in | |
| // log-files. Keep in sync. | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Metadata hash signature matches value in Omaha response."; | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| ErrorCode DeltaPerformer::ValidateManifest() { | |
| // Perform assorted checks to sanity check the manifest, make sure it | |
| // matches data from other sources, and that it is a supported version. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(garnold) in general, the presence of an old partition hash should be | |
| // the sole indicator for a delta update, as we would generally like update | |
| // payloads to be self contained and not assume an Omaha response to tell us | |
| // that. However, since this requires some massive reengineering of the update | |
| // flow (making filesystem copying happen conditionally only *after* | |
| // downloading and parsing of the update manifest) we'll put it off for now. | |
| // See chromium-os:7597 for further discussion. | |
| if (install_plan_->is_full_update) { | |
| if (manifest_.has_old_kernel_info() || manifest_.has_old_rootfs_info()) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Purported full payload contains old partition " | |
| "hash(es), aborting update"; | |
| return ErrorCode::kPayloadMismatchedType; | |
| } | |
| if (manifest_.minor_version() != kFullPayloadMinorVersion) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Manifest contains minor version " | |
| << manifest_.minor_version() | |
| << ", but all full payloads should have version " | |
| << kFullPayloadMinorVersion << "."; | |
| return ErrorCode::kUnsupportedMinorPayloadVersion; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| if (manifest_.minor_version() != kSupportedMinorPayloadVersion) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Manifest contains minor version " | |
| << manifest_.minor_version() | |
| << " not the supported " | |
| << kSupportedMinorPayloadVersion; | |
| return ErrorCode::kUnsupportedMinorPayloadVersion; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // TODO(garnold) we should be adding more and more manifest checks, such as | |
| // partition boundaries etc (see chromium-os:37661). | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| ErrorCode DeltaPerformer::ValidateOperationHash( | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation& operation) { | |
| if (!operation.data_sha256_hash().size()) { | |
| if (!operation.data_length()) { | |
| // Operations that do not have any data blob won't have any operation hash | |
| // either. So, these operations are always considered validated since the | |
| // metadata that contains all the non-data-blob portions of the operation | |
| // has already been validated. This is true for both HTTP and HTTPS cases. | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| // No hash is present for an operation that has data blobs. This shouldn't | |
| // happen normally for any client that has this code, because the | |
| // corresponding update should have been produced with the operation | |
| // hashes. So if it happens it means either we've turned operation hash | |
| // generation off in DeltaDiffGenerator or it's a regression of some sort. | |
| // One caveat though: The last operation is a dummy signature operation | |
| // that doesn't have a hash at the time the manifest is created. So we | |
| // should not complaint about that operation. This operation can be | |
| // recognized by the fact that it's offset is mentioned in the manifest. | |
| if (manifest_.signatures_offset() && | |
| manifest_.signatures_offset() == operation.data_offset()) { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Skipping hash verification for signature operation " | |
| << next_operation_num_ + 1; | |
| } else { | |
| if (install_plan_->hash_checks_mandatory) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Missing mandatory operation hash for operation " | |
| << next_operation_num_ + 1; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadOperationHashMissingError; | |
| } | |
| // For non-mandatory cases, just send a UMA stat. | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot validate operation " << next_operation_num_ + 1 | |
| << " as there's no operation hash in manifest"; | |
| SendUmaStat(ErrorCode::kDownloadOperationHashMissingError); | |
| } | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| vector<char> expected_op_hash; | |
| expected_op_hash.assign(operation.data_sha256_hash().data(), | |
| (operation.data_sha256_hash().data() + | |
| operation.data_sha256_hash().size())); | |
| OmahaHashCalculator operation_hasher; | |
| operation_hasher.Update(&buffer_[0], operation.data_length()); | |
| if (!operation_hasher.Finalize()) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to compute actual hash of operation " | |
| << next_operation_num_; | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadOperationHashVerificationError; | |
| } | |
| vector<char> calculated_op_hash = operation_hasher.raw_hash(); | |
| if (calculated_op_hash != expected_op_hash) { | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Hash verification failed for operation " | |
| << next_operation_num_ << ". Expected hash = "; | |
| utils::HexDumpVector(expected_op_hash); | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Calculated hash over " << operation.data_length() | |
| << " bytes at offset: " << operation.data_offset() << " = "; | |
| utils::HexDumpVector(calculated_op_hash); | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadOperationHashMismatch; | |
| } | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| #define TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(_retval, _condition) \ | |
| do { \ | |
| if (!(_condition)) { \ | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "VerifyPayload failure: " << #_condition; \ | |
| return _retval; \ | |
| } \ | |
| } while (0); | |
| ErrorCode DeltaPerformer::VerifyPayload( | |
| const std::string& update_check_response_hash, | |
| const uint64_t update_check_response_size) { | |
| // See if we should use the public RSA key in the Omaha response. | |
| base::FilePath path_to_public_key(public_key_path_); | |
| base::FilePath tmp_key; | |
| if (GetPublicKeyFromResponse(&tmp_key)) | |
| path_to_public_key = tmp_key; | |
| ScopedPathUnlinker tmp_key_remover(tmp_key.value()); | |
| if (tmp_key.empty()) | |
| tmp_key_remover.set_should_remove(false); | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Verifying payload using public key: " | |
| << path_to_public_key.value(); | |
| // Verifies the download size. | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kPayloadSizeMismatchError, | |
| update_check_response_size == | |
| metadata_size_ + buffer_offset_); | |
| // Verifies the payload hash. | |
| const string& payload_hash_data = hash_calculator_.hash(); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadVerificationError, | |
| !payload_hash_data.empty()); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kPayloadHashMismatchError, | |
| payload_hash_data == update_check_response_hash); | |
| // Verifies the signed payload hash. | |
| if (!utils::FileExists(path_to_public_key.value().c_str())) { | |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Not verifying signed delta payload -- missing public key."; | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kSignedDeltaPayloadExpectedError, | |
| !signatures_message_data_.empty()); | |
| vector<char> signed_hash_data; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError, | |
| PayloadVerifier::VerifySignature( | |
| signatures_message_data_, | |
| path_to_public_key.value(), | |
| &signed_hash_data)); | |
| OmahaHashCalculator signed_hasher; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError, | |
| signed_hasher.SetContext(signed_hash_context_)); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError, | |
| signed_hasher.Finalize()); | |
| vector<char> hash_data = signed_hasher.raw_hash(); | |
| PayloadVerifier::PadRSA2048SHA256Hash(&hash_data); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError, | |
| !hash_data.empty()); | |
| if (hash_data != signed_hash_data) { | |
| // The autoupdate_CatchBadSignatures test checks for this string | |
| // in log-files. Keep in sync. | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Public key verification failed, thus update failed. " | |
| "Attached Signature:"; | |
| utils::HexDumpVector(signed_hash_data); | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "Computed Signature:"; | |
| utils::HexDumpVector(hash_data); | |
| return ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError; | |
| } | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Payload hash matches value in payload."; | |
| // At this point, we are guaranteed to have downloaded a full payload, i.e | |
| // the one whose size matches the size mentioned in Omaha response. If any | |
| // errors happen after this, it's likely a problem with the payload itself or | |
| // the state of the system and not a problem with the URL or network. So, | |
| // indicate that to the payload state so that AU can backoff appropriately. | |
| system_state_->payload_state()->DownloadComplete(); | |
| return ErrorCode::kSuccess; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::GetNewPartitionInfo(uint64_t* kernel_size, | |
| vector<char>* kernel_hash, | |
| uint64_t* rootfs_size, | |
| vector<char>* rootfs_hash) { | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(manifest_valid_ && | |
| manifest_.has_new_kernel_info() && | |
| manifest_.has_new_rootfs_info()); | |
| *kernel_size = manifest_.new_kernel_info().size(); | |
| *rootfs_size = manifest_.new_rootfs_info().size(); | |
| vector<char> new_kernel_hash(manifest_.new_kernel_info().hash().begin(), | |
| manifest_.new_kernel_info().hash().end()); | |
| vector<char> new_rootfs_hash(manifest_.new_rootfs_info().hash().begin(), | |
| manifest_.new_rootfs_info().hash().end()); | |
| kernel_hash->swap(new_kernel_hash); | |
| rootfs_hash->swap(new_rootfs_hash); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| namespace { | |
| void LogVerifyError(bool is_kern, | |
| const string& local_hash, | |
| const string& expected_hash) { | |
| const char* type = is_kern ? "kernel" : "rootfs"; | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "This is a server-side error due to " | |
| << "mismatched delta update image!"; | |
| LOG(ERROR) << "The delta I've been given contains a " << type << " delta " | |
| << "update that must be applied over a " << type << " with " | |
| << "a specific checksum, but the " << type << " we're starting " | |
| << "with doesn't have that checksum! This means that " | |
| << "the delta I've been given doesn't match my existing " | |
| << "system. The " << type << " partition I have has hash: " | |
| << local_hash << " but the update expected me to have " | |
| << expected_hash << " ."; | |
| if (is_kern) { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "To get the checksum of a kernel partition on a " | |
| << "booted machine, run this command (change /dev/sda2 " | |
| << "as needed): dd if=/dev/sda2 bs=1M 2>/dev/null | " | |
| << "openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl base64"; | |
| } else { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "To get the checksum of a rootfs partition on a " | |
| << "booted machine, run this command (change /dev/sda3 " | |
| << "as needed): dd if=/dev/sda3 bs=1M count=$(( " | |
| << "$(dumpe2fs /dev/sda3 2>/dev/null | grep 'Block count' " | |
| << "| sed 's/[^0-9]*//') / 256 )) | " | |
| << "openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl base64"; | |
| } | |
| LOG(INFO) << "To get the checksum of partitions in a bin file, " | |
| << "run: .../src/scripts/sha256_partitions.sh .../file.bin"; | |
| } | |
| string StringForHashBytes(const void* bytes, size_t size) { | |
| string ret; | |
| if (!OmahaHashCalculator::Base64Encode(bytes, size, &ret)) { | |
| ret = "<unknown>"; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } // namespace | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::VerifySourcePartitions() { | |
| LOG(INFO) << "Verifying source partitions."; | |
| CHECK(manifest_valid_); | |
| CHECK(install_plan_); | |
| if (manifest_.has_old_kernel_info()) { | |
| const PartitionInfo& info = manifest_.old_kernel_info(); | |
| bool valid = | |
| !install_plan_->kernel_hash.empty() && | |
| install_plan_->kernel_hash.size() == info.hash().size() && | |
| memcmp(install_plan_->kernel_hash.data(), | |
| info.hash().data(), | |
| install_plan_->kernel_hash.size()) == 0; | |
| if (!valid) { | |
| LogVerifyError(true, | |
| StringForHashBytes(install_plan_->kernel_hash.data(), | |
| install_plan_->kernel_hash.size()), | |
| StringForHashBytes(info.hash().data(), | |
| info.hash().size())); | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(valid); | |
| } | |
| if (manifest_.has_old_rootfs_info()) { | |
| const PartitionInfo& info = manifest_.old_rootfs_info(); | |
| bool valid = | |
| !install_plan_->rootfs_hash.empty() && | |
| install_plan_->rootfs_hash.size() == info.hash().size() && | |
| memcmp(install_plan_->rootfs_hash.data(), | |
| info.hash().data(), | |
| install_plan_->rootfs_hash.size()) == 0; | |
| if (!valid) { | |
| LogVerifyError(false, | |
| StringForHashBytes(install_plan_->rootfs_hash.data(), | |
| install_plan_->rootfs_hash.size()), | |
| StringForHashBytes(info.hash().data(), | |
| info.hash().size())); | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(valid); | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| void DeltaPerformer::DiscardBuffer(bool do_advance_offset) { | |
| // Update the buffer offset. | |
| if (do_advance_offset) | |
| buffer_offset_ += buffer_.size(); | |
| // Hash the content. | |
| hash_calculator_.Update(&buffer_[0], buffer_.size()); | |
| // Swap content with an empty vector to ensure that all memory is released. | |
| vector<char>().swap(buffer_); | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::CanResumeUpdate(PrefsInterface* prefs, | |
| string update_check_response_hash) { | |
| int64_t next_operation = kUpdateStateOperationInvalid; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs->GetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextOperation, | |
| &next_operation) && | |
| next_operation != kUpdateStateOperationInvalid && | |
| next_operation > 0); | |
| string interrupted_hash; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs->GetString(kPrefsUpdateCheckResponseHash, | |
| &interrupted_hash) && | |
| !interrupted_hash.empty() && | |
| interrupted_hash == update_check_response_hash); | |
| int64_t resumed_update_failures; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(!prefs->GetInt64(kPrefsResumedUpdateFailures, | |
| &resumed_update_failures) || | |
| resumed_update_failures <= kMaxResumedUpdateFailures); | |
| // Sanity check the rest. | |
| int64_t next_data_offset = -1; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs->GetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataOffset, | |
| &next_data_offset) && | |
| next_data_offset >= 0); | |
| string sha256_context; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| prefs->GetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSHA256Context, &sha256_context) && | |
| !sha256_context.empty()); | |
| int64_t manifest_metadata_size = 0; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs->GetInt64(kPrefsManifestMetadataSize, | |
| &manifest_metadata_size) && | |
| manifest_metadata_size > 0); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::ResetUpdateProgress(PrefsInterface* prefs, bool quick) { | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextOperation, | |
| kUpdateStateOperationInvalid)); | |
| if (!quick) { | |
| prefs->SetString(kPrefsUpdateCheckResponseHash, ""); | |
| prefs->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataOffset, -1); | |
| prefs->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataLength, 0); | |
| prefs->SetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSHA256Context, ""); | |
| prefs->SetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSignedSHA256Context, ""); | |
| prefs->SetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSignatureBlob, ""); | |
| prefs->SetInt64(kPrefsManifestMetadataSize, -1); | |
| prefs->SetInt64(kPrefsResumedUpdateFailures, 0); | |
| } | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::CheckpointUpdateProgress() { | |
| Terminator::set_exit_blocked(true); | |
| if (last_updated_buffer_offset_ != buffer_offset_) { | |
| // Resets the progress in case we die in the middle of the state update. | |
| ResetUpdateProgress(prefs_, true); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE( | |
| prefs_->SetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSHA256Context, | |
| hash_calculator_.GetContext())); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataOffset, | |
| buffer_offset_)); | |
| last_updated_buffer_offset_ = buffer_offset_; | |
| if (next_operation_num_ < num_total_operations_) { | |
| const bool is_kernel_partition = | |
| next_operation_num_ >= num_rootfs_operations_; | |
| const DeltaArchiveManifest_InstallOperation &op = | |
| is_kernel_partition ? | |
| manifest_.kernel_install_operations( | |
| next_operation_num_ - num_rootfs_operations_) : | |
| manifest_.install_operations(next_operation_num_); | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataLength, | |
| op.data_length())); | |
| } else { | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataLength, | |
| 0)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->SetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextOperation, | |
| next_operation_num_)); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| bool DeltaPerformer::PrimeUpdateState() { | |
| CHECK(manifest_valid_); | |
| block_size_ = manifest_.block_size(); | |
| int64_t next_operation = kUpdateStateOperationInvalid; | |
| if (!prefs_->GetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextOperation, &next_operation) || | |
| next_operation == kUpdateStateOperationInvalid || | |
| next_operation <= 0) { | |
| // Initiating a new update, no more state needs to be initialized. | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(VerifySourcePartitions()); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| next_operation_num_ = next_operation; | |
| // Resuming an update -- load the rest of the update state. | |
| int64_t next_data_offset = -1; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->GetInt64(kPrefsUpdateStateNextDataOffset, | |
| &next_data_offset) && | |
| next_data_offset >= 0); | |
| buffer_offset_ = next_data_offset; | |
| // The signed hash context and the signature blob may be empty if the | |
| // interrupted update didn't reach the signature. | |
| prefs_->GetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSignedSHA256Context, | |
| &signed_hash_context_); | |
| string signature_blob; | |
| if (prefs_->GetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSignatureBlob, &signature_blob)) { | |
| signatures_message_data_.assign(signature_blob.begin(), | |
| signature_blob.end()); | |
| } | |
| string hash_context; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->GetString(kPrefsUpdateStateSHA256Context, | |
| &hash_context) && | |
| hash_calculator_.SetContext(hash_context)); | |
| int64_t manifest_metadata_size = 0; | |
| TEST_AND_RETURN_FALSE(prefs_->GetInt64(kPrefsManifestMetadataSize, | |
| &manifest_metadata_size) && | |
| manifest_metadata_size > 0); | |
| metadata_size_ = manifest_metadata_size; | |
| // Advance the download progress to reflect what doesn't need to be | |
| // re-downloaded. | |
| total_bytes_received_ += buffer_offset_; | |
| // Speculatively count the resume as a failure. | |
| int64_t resumed_update_failures; | |
| if (prefs_->GetInt64(kPrefsResumedUpdateFailures, &resumed_update_failures)) { | |
| resumed_update_failures++; | |
| } else { | |
| resumed_update_failures = 1; | |
| } | |
| prefs_->SetInt64(kPrefsResumedUpdateFailures, resumed_update_failures); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| void DeltaPerformer::SendUmaStat(ErrorCode code) { | |
| utils::SendErrorCodeToUma(system_state_, code); | |
| } | |
| } // namespace chromeos_update_engine |