| #[cfg(feature = "logging")] |
| use crate::bs_debug; |
| use crate::check::inappropriate_handshake_message; |
| use crate::conn::{CommonState, ConnectionRandoms, State}; |
| use crate::error::Error; |
| use crate::hash_hs::HandshakeHashBuffer; |
| use crate::kx; |
| #[cfg(feature = "logging")] |
| use crate::log::{debug, trace}; |
| use crate::msgs::base::Payload; |
| #[cfg(feature = "quic")] |
| use crate::msgs::base::PayloadU16; |
| use crate::msgs::codec::{Codec, Reader}; |
| use crate::msgs::enums::{ |
| AlertDescription, CipherSuite, Compression, ContentType, ProtocolVersion, |
| }; |
| use crate::msgs::enums::{ECPointFormat, PSKKeyExchangeMode}; |
| use crate::msgs::enums::{ExtensionType, HandshakeType}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{CertificateStatusRequest, ClientSessionTicket, SCTList}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{ClientExtension, HasServerExtensions}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{ClientHelloPayload, HandshakeMessagePayload, HandshakePayload}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{ConvertProtocolNameList, ProtocolNameList}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{ECPointFormatList, SupportedPointFormats}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{HelloRetryRequest, KeyShareEntry}; |
| use crate::msgs::handshake::{Random, SessionID}; |
| use crate::msgs::message::{Message, MessagePayload}; |
| use crate::msgs::persist; |
| use crate::ticketer::TimeBase; |
| use crate::tls13::key_schedule::KeyScheduleEarly; |
| use crate::SupportedCipherSuite; |
| |
| #[cfg(feature = "tls12")] |
| use super::tls12; |
| use crate::client::client_conn::ClientConnectionData; |
| use crate::client::common::ClientHelloDetails; |
| use crate::client::{tls13, ClientConfig, ServerName}; |
| |
| use std::sync::Arc; |
| |
| pub(super) type NextState = Box<dyn State<ClientConnectionData>>; |
| pub(super) type NextStateOrError = Result<NextState, Error>; |
| pub(super) type ClientContext<'a> = crate::conn::Context<'a, ClientConnectionData>; |
| |
| fn find_session( |
| server_name: &ServerName, |
| config: &ClientConfig, |
| #[cfg(feature = "quic")] cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, |
| ) -> Option<persist::Retrieved<persist::ClientSessionValue>> { |
| let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::session_for_server_name(server_name); |
| let key_buf = key.get_encoding(); |
| |
| let value = config |
| .session_storage |
| .get(&key_buf) |
| .or_else(|| { |
| debug!("No cached session for {:?}", server_name); |
| None |
| })?; |
| |
| #[allow(unused_mut)] |
| let mut reader = Reader::init(&value[2..]); |
| #[allow(clippy::bind_instead_of_map)] // https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/8082 |
| CipherSuite::read_bytes(&value[..2]) |
| .and_then(|suite| { |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::read(&mut reader, suite, &config.cipher_suites) |
| }) |
| .and_then(|resuming| { |
| let retrieved = persist::Retrieved::new(resuming, TimeBase::now().ok()?); |
| match retrieved.has_expired() { |
| false => Some(retrieved), |
| true => None, |
| } |
| }) |
| .and_then(|resuming| { |
| #[cfg(feature = "quic")] |
| if cx.common.is_quic() { |
| let params = PayloadU16::read(&mut reader)?; |
| cx.common.quic.params = Some(params.0); |
| } |
| Some(resuming) |
| }) |
| } |
| |
| pub(super) fn start_handshake( |
| server_name: ServerName, |
| extra_exts: Vec<ClientExtension>, |
| config: Arc<ClientConfig>, |
| cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, |
| ) -> NextStateOrError { |
| let mut transcript_buffer = HandshakeHashBuffer::new(); |
| if config |
| .client_auth_cert_resolver |
| .has_certs() |
| { |
| transcript_buffer.set_client_auth_enabled(); |
| } |
| |
| let support_tls13 = config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3); |
| |
| let mut session_id: Option<SessionID> = None; |
| let mut resuming_session = find_session( |
| &server_name, |
| &config, |
| #[cfg(feature = "quic")] |
| cx, |
| ); |
| |
| let key_share = if support_tls13 { |
| Some(tls13::initial_key_share(&config, &server_name)?) |
| } else { |
| None |
| }; |
| |
| if let Some(_resuming) = &mut resuming_session { |
| #[cfg(feature = "tls12")] |
| if let persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls12(inner) = &mut _resuming.value { |
| // If we have a ticket, we use the sessionid as a signal that |
| // we're doing an abbreviated handshake. See section 3.4 in |
| // RFC5077. |
| if !inner.ticket().is_empty() { |
| inner.session_id = SessionID::random()?; |
| } |
| session_id = Some(inner.session_id); |
| } |
| |
| debug!("Resuming session"); |
| } else { |
| debug!("Not resuming any session"); |
| } |
| |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#appendix-D.4 |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-34#section-8.4 |
| if session_id.is_none() && !cx.common.is_quic() { |
| session_id = Some(SessionID::random()?); |
| } |
| |
| let random = Random::new()?; |
| let hello_details = ClientHelloDetails::new(); |
| let sent_tls13_fake_ccs = false; |
| let may_send_sct_list = config.verifier.request_scts(); |
| Ok(emit_client_hello_for_retry( |
| config, |
| cx, |
| resuming_session, |
| random, |
| false, |
| transcript_buffer, |
| sent_tls13_fake_ccs, |
| hello_details, |
| session_id, |
| None, |
| server_name, |
| key_share, |
| extra_exts, |
| may_send_sct_list, |
| None, |
| )) |
| } |
| |
| struct ExpectServerHello { |
| config: Arc<ClientConfig>, |
| resuming_session: Option<persist::Retrieved<persist::ClientSessionValue>>, |
| server_name: ServerName, |
| random: Random, |
| using_ems: bool, |
| transcript_buffer: HandshakeHashBuffer, |
| early_key_schedule: Option<KeyScheduleEarly>, |
| hello: ClientHelloDetails, |
| offered_key_share: Option<kx::KeyExchange>, |
| session_id: SessionID, |
| sent_tls13_fake_ccs: bool, |
| suite: Option<SupportedCipherSuite>, |
| } |
| |
| struct ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest { |
| next: ExpectServerHello, |
| extra_exts: Vec<ClientExtension>, |
| } |
| |
| fn emit_client_hello_for_retry( |
| config: Arc<ClientConfig>, |
| cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, |
| resuming_session: Option<persist::Retrieved<persist::ClientSessionValue>>, |
| random: Random, |
| using_ems: bool, |
| mut transcript_buffer: HandshakeHashBuffer, |
| mut sent_tls13_fake_ccs: bool, |
| mut hello: ClientHelloDetails, |
| session_id: Option<SessionID>, |
| retryreq: Option<&HelloRetryRequest>, |
| server_name: ServerName, |
| key_share: Option<kx::KeyExchange>, |
| extra_exts: Vec<ClientExtension>, |
| may_send_sct_list: bool, |
| suite: Option<SupportedCipherSuite>, |
| ) -> NextState { |
| // Do we have a SessionID or ticket cached for this host? |
| let (ticket, resume_version) = if let Some(resuming) = &resuming_session { |
| match &resuming.value { |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls13(inner) => { |
| (inner.ticket().to_vec(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) |
| } |
| #[cfg(feature = "tls12")] |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls12(inner) => { |
| (inner.ticket().to_vec(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2) |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| (Vec::new(), ProtocolVersion::Unknown(0)) |
| }; |
| |
| let support_tls12 = config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2) && !cx.common.is_quic(); |
| let support_tls13 = config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3); |
| |
| let mut supported_versions = Vec::new(); |
| if support_tls13 { |
| supported_versions.push(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3); |
| } |
| |
| if support_tls12 { |
| supported_versions.push(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2); |
| } |
| |
| // should be unreachable thanks to config builder |
| assert!(!supported_versions.is_empty()); |
| |
| let mut exts = vec![ |
| ClientExtension::SupportedVersions(supported_versions), |
| ClientExtension::ECPointFormats(ECPointFormatList::supported()), |
| ClientExtension::NamedGroups( |
| config |
| .kx_groups |
| .iter() |
| .map(|skxg| skxg.name) |
| .collect(), |
| ), |
| ClientExtension::SignatureAlgorithms( |
| config |
| .verifier |
| .supported_verify_schemes(), |
| ), |
| ClientExtension::ExtendedMasterSecretRequest, |
| ClientExtension::CertificateStatusRequest(CertificateStatusRequest::build_ocsp()), |
| ]; |
| |
| if let (Some(sni_name), true) = (server_name.for_sni(), config.enable_sni) { |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::make_sni(sni_name)); |
| } |
| |
| if may_send_sct_list { |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::SignedCertificateTimestampRequest); |
| } |
| |
| if let Some(key_share) = &key_share { |
| debug_assert!(support_tls13); |
| let key_share = KeyShareEntry::new(key_share.group(), key_share.pubkey.as_ref()); |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::KeyShare(vec![key_share])); |
| } |
| |
| if let Some(cookie) = retryreq.and_then(HelloRetryRequest::get_cookie) { |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::Cookie(cookie.clone())); |
| } |
| |
| if support_tls13 && config.enable_tickets { |
| // We could support PSK_KE here too. Such connections don't |
| // have forward secrecy, and are similar to TLS1.2 resumption. |
| let psk_modes = vec![PSKKeyExchangeMode::PSK_DHE_KE]; |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::PresharedKeyModes(psk_modes)); |
| } |
| |
| if !config.alpn_protocols.is_empty() { |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::Protocols(ProtocolNameList::from_slices( |
| &config |
| .alpn_protocols |
| .iter() |
| .map(|proto| &proto[..]) |
| .collect::<Vec<_>>(), |
| ))); |
| } |
| |
| // Extra extensions must be placed before the PSK extension |
| exts.extend(extra_exts.iter().cloned()); |
| |
| let fill_in_binder = if support_tls13 |
| && config.enable_tickets |
| && resume_version == ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 |
| && !ticket.is_empty() |
| { |
| resuming_session |
| .as_ref() |
| .and_then(|resuming| match (suite, resuming.tls13()) { |
| (Some(suite), Some(resuming)) => { |
| suite |
| .tls13()? |
| .can_resume_from(resuming.suite())?; |
| Some(resuming) |
| } |
| (None, Some(resuming)) => Some(resuming), |
| _ => None, |
| }) |
| .map(|resuming| { |
| tls13::prepare_resumption( |
| &config, |
| cx, |
| ticket, |
| &resuming, |
| &mut exts, |
| retryreq.is_some(), |
| ); |
| resuming |
| }) |
| } else if config.enable_tickets { |
| // If we have a ticket, include it. Otherwise, request one. |
| if ticket.is_empty() { |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::SessionTicket(ClientSessionTicket::Request)); |
| } else { |
| exts.push(ClientExtension::SessionTicket(ClientSessionTicket::Offer( |
| Payload::new(ticket), |
| ))); |
| } |
| None |
| } else { |
| None |
| }; |
| |
| // Note what extensions we sent. |
| hello.sent_extensions = exts |
| .iter() |
| .map(ClientExtension::get_type) |
| .collect(); |
| |
| let session_id = session_id.unwrap_or_else(SessionID::empty); |
| let mut cipher_suites: Vec<_> = config |
| .cipher_suites |
| .iter() |
| .map(|cs| cs.suite()) |
| .collect(); |
| // We don't do renegotiation at all, in fact. |
| cipher_suites.push(CipherSuite::TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV); |
| |
| let mut chp = HandshakeMessagePayload { |
| typ: HandshakeType::ClientHello, |
| payload: HandshakePayload::ClientHello(ClientHelloPayload { |
| client_version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2, |
| random, |
| session_id, |
| cipher_suites, |
| compression_methods: vec![Compression::Null], |
| extensions: exts, |
| }), |
| }; |
| |
| let early_key_schedule = if let Some(resuming) = fill_in_binder { |
| let schedule = tls13::fill_in_psk_binder(&resuming, &transcript_buffer, &mut chp); |
| Some((resuming.suite(), schedule)) |
| } else { |
| None |
| }; |
| |
| let ch = Message { |
| // "This value MUST be set to 0x0303 for all records generated |
| // by a TLS 1.3 implementation other than an initial ClientHello |
| // (i.e., one not generated after a HelloRetryRequest)" |
| version: if retryreq.is_some() { |
| ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 |
| } else { |
| ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_0 |
| }, |
| payload: MessagePayload::handshake(chp), |
| }; |
| |
| if retryreq.is_some() { |
| // send dummy CCS to fool middleboxes prior |
| // to second client hello |
| tls13::emit_fake_ccs(&mut sent_tls13_fake_ccs, cx.common); |
| } |
| |
| trace!("Sending ClientHello {:#?}", ch); |
| |
| transcript_buffer.add_message(&ch); |
| cx.common.send_msg(ch, false); |
| |
| // Calculate the hash of ClientHello and use it to derive EarlyTrafficSecret |
| let early_key_schedule = early_key_schedule.map(|(resuming_suite, schedule)| { |
| if !cx.data.early_data.is_enabled() { |
| return schedule; |
| } |
| |
| tls13::derive_early_traffic_secret( |
| &*config.key_log, |
| cx, |
| resuming_suite, |
| &schedule, |
| &mut sent_tls13_fake_ccs, |
| &transcript_buffer, |
| &random.0, |
| ); |
| schedule |
| }); |
| |
| let next = ExpectServerHello { |
| config, |
| resuming_session, |
| server_name, |
| random, |
| using_ems, |
| transcript_buffer, |
| early_key_schedule, |
| hello, |
| offered_key_share: key_share, |
| session_id, |
| sent_tls13_fake_ccs, |
| suite, |
| }; |
| |
| if support_tls13 && retryreq.is_none() { |
| Box::new(ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest { next, extra_exts }) |
| } else { |
| Box::new(next) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| pub(super) fn process_alpn_protocol( |
| common: &mut CommonState, |
| config: &ClientConfig, |
| proto: Option<&[u8]>, |
| ) -> Result<(), Error> { |
| common.alpn_protocol = proto.map(ToOwned::to_owned); |
| |
| if let Some(alpn_protocol) = &common.alpn_protocol { |
| if !config |
| .alpn_protocols |
| .contains(alpn_protocol) |
| { |
| return Err(common.illegal_param("server sent non-offered ALPN protocol")); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #[cfg(feature = "quic")] |
| { |
| // RFC 9001 says: "While ALPN only specifies that servers use this alert, QUIC clients MUST |
| // use error 0x0178 to terminate a connection when ALPN negotiation fails." We judge that |
| // the user intended to use ALPN (rather than some out-of-band protocol negotiation |
| // mechanism) iff any ALPN protocols were configured. This defends against badly-behaved |
| // servers which accept a connection that requires an application-layer protocol they do not |
| // understand. |
| if common.is_quic() && common.alpn_protocol.is_none() && !config.alpn_protocols.is_empty() { |
| common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::NoApplicationProtocol); |
| return Err(Error::NoApplicationProtocol); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| debug!( |
| "ALPN protocol is {:?}", |
| common |
| .alpn_protocol |
| .as_ref() |
| .map(|v| bs_debug::BsDebug(v)) |
| ); |
| Ok(()) |
| } |
| |
| pub(super) fn sct_list_is_invalid(scts: &SCTList) -> bool { |
| scts.is_empty() || scts.iter().any(|sct| sct.0.is_empty()) |
| } |
| |
| impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectServerHello { |
| fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError { |
| let server_hello = |
| require_handshake_msg!(m, HandshakeType::ServerHello, HandshakePayload::ServerHello)?; |
| trace!("We got ServerHello {:#?}", server_hello); |
| |
| use crate::ProtocolVersion::{TLSv1_2, TLSv1_3}; |
| let tls13_supported = self.config.supports_version(TLSv1_3); |
| |
| let server_version = if server_hello.legacy_version == TLSv1_2 { |
| server_hello |
| .get_supported_versions() |
| .unwrap_or(server_hello.legacy_version) |
| } else { |
| server_hello.legacy_version |
| }; |
| |
| let version = match server_version { |
| TLSv1_3 if tls13_supported => TLSv1_3, |
| TLSv1_2 if self.config.supports_version(TLSv1_2) => { |
| if cx.data.early_data.is_enabled() && cx.common.early_traffic { |
| // The client must fail with a dedicated error code if the server |
| // responds with TLS 1.2 when offering 0-RTT. |
| return Err(Error::PeerMisbehavedError( |
| "server chose v1.2 when offering 0-rtt".to_string(), |
| )); |
| } |
| |
| if server_hello |
| .get_supported_versions() |
| .is_some() |
| { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server chose v1.2 using v1.3 extension")); |
| } |
| |
| TLSv1_2 |
| } |
| _ => { |
| cx.common |
| .send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion); |
| let msg = match server_version { |
| TLSv1_2 | TLSv1_3 => "server's TLS version is disabled in client", |
| _ => "server does not support TLS v1.2/v1.3", |
| }; |
| return Err(Error::PeerIncompatibleError(msg.to_string())); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| if server_hello.compression_method != Compression::Null { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server chose non-Null compression")); |
| } |
| |
| if server_hello.has_duplicate_extension() { |
| cx.common |
| .send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError); |
| return Err(Error::PeerMisbehavedError( |
| "server sent duplicate extensions".to_string(), |
| )); |
| } |
| |
| let allowed_unsolicited = [ExtensionType::RenegotiationInfo]; |
| if self |
| .hello |
| .server_sent_unsolicited_extensions(&server_hello.extensions, &allowed_unsolicited) |
| { |
| cx.common |
| .send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension); |
| return Err(Error::PeerMisbehavedError( |
| "server sent unsolicited extension".to_string(), |
| )); |
| } |
| |
| cx.common.negotiated_version = Some(version); |
| |
| // Extract ALPN protocol |
| if !cx.common.is_tls13() { |
| process_alpn_protocol(cx.common, &self.config, server_hello.get_alpn_protocol())?; |
| } |
| |
| // If ECPointFormats extension is supplied by the server, it must contain |
| // Uncompressed. But it's allowed to be omitted. |
| if let Some(point_fmts) = server_hello.get_ecpoints_extension() { |
| if !point_fmts.contains(&ECPointFormat::Uncompressed) { |
| cx.common |
| .send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure); |
| return Err(Error::PeerMisbehavedError( |
| "server does not support uncompressed points".to_string(), |
| )); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| let suite = self |
| .config |
| .find_cipher_suite(server_hello.cipher_suite) |
| .ok_or_else(|| { |
| cx.common |
| .send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure); |
| Error::PeerMisbehavedError("server chose non-offered ciphersuite".to_string()) |
| })?; |
| |
| if version != suite.version().version { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server chose unusable ciphersuite for version")); |
| } |
| |
| match self.suite { |
| Some(prev_suite) if prev_suite != suite => { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server varied selected ciphersuite")); |
| } |
| _ => { |
| debug!("Using ciphersuite {:?}", suite); |
| self.suite = Some(suite); |
| cx.common.suite = Some(suite); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Start our handshake hash, and input the server-hello. |
| let mut transcript = self |
| .transcript_buffer |
| .start_hash(suite.hash_algorithm()); |
| transcript.add_message(&m); |
| |
| let randoms = ConnectionRandoms::new(self.random, server_hello.random); |
| // For TLS1.3, start message encryption using |
| // handshake_traffic_secret. |
| match suite { |
| SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(suite) => { |
| let resuming_session = self |
| .resuming_session |
| .and_then(|resuming| match resuming.value { |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls13(inner) => Some(inner), |
| #[cfg(feature = "tls12")] |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls12(_) => None, |
| }); |
| |
| tls13::handle_server_hello( |
| self.config, |
| cx, |
| server_hello, |
| resuming_session, |
| self.server_name, |
| randoms, |
| suite, |
| transcript, |
| self.early_key_schedule, |
| self.hello, |
| // We always send a key share when TLS 1.3 is enabled. |
| self.offered_key_share.unwrap(), |
| self.sent_tls13_fake_ccs, |
| ) |
| } |
| #[cfg(feature = "tls12")] |
| SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(suite) => { |
| let resuming_session = self |
| .resuming_session |
| .and_then(|resuming| match resuming.value { |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls12(inner) => Some(inner), |
| persist::ClientSessionValue::Tls13(_) => None, |
| }); |
| |
| tls12::CompleteServerHelloHandling { |
| config: self.config, |
| resuming_session, |
| server_name: self.server_name, |
| randoms, |
| using_ems: self.using_ems, |
| transcript, |
| } |
| .handle_server_hello(cx, suite, server_hello, tls13_supported) |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| impl ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest { |
| fn into_expect_server_hello(self) -> NextState { |
| Box::new(self.next) |
| } |
| |
| fn handle_hello_retry_request( |
| self, |
| cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, |
| m: Message, |
| ) -> NextStateOrError { |
| let hrr = require_handshake_msg!( |
| m, |
| HandshakeType::HelloRetryRequest, |
| HandshakePayload::HelloRetryRequest |
| )?; |
| trace!("Got HRR {:?}", hrr); |
| |
| cx.common.check_aligned_handshake()?; |
| |
| let cookie = hrr.get_cookie(); |
| let req_group = hrr.get_requested_key_share_group(); |
| |
| // We always send a key share when TLS 1.3 is enabled. |
| let offered_key_share = self.next.offered_key_share.unwrap(); |
| |
| // A retry request is illegal if it contains no cookie and asks for |
| // retry of a group we already sent. |
| if cookie.is_none() && req_group == Some(offered_key_share.group()) { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server requested hrr with our group")); |
| } |
| |
| // Or has an empty cookie. |
| if let Some(cookie) = cookie { |
| if cookie.0.is_empty() { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server requested hrr with empty cookie")); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Or has something unrecognised |
| if hrr.has_unknown_extension() { |
| cx.common |
| .send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension); |
| return Err(Error::PeerIncompatibleError( |
| "server sent hrr with unhandled extension".to_string(), |
| )); |
| } |
| |
| // Or has the same extensions more than once |
| if hrr.has_duplicate_extension() { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server send duplicate hrr extensions")); |
| } |
| |
| // Or asks us to change nothing. |
| if cookie.is_none() && req_group.is_none() { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server requested hrr with no changes")); |
| } |
| |
| // Or asks us to talk a protocol we didn't offer, or doesn't support HRR at all. |
| match hrr.get_supported_versions() { |
| Some(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) => { |
| cx.common.negotiated_version = Some(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3); |
| } |
| _ => { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server requested unsupported version in hrr")); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Or asks us to use a ciphersuite we didn't offer. |
| let maybe_cs = self |
| .next |
| .config |
| .find_cipher_suite(hrr.cipher_suite); |
| let cs = match maybe_cs { |
| Some(cs) => cs, |
| None => { |
| return Err(cx |
| .common |
| .illegal_param("server requested unsupported cs in hrr")); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| // HRR selects the ciphersuite. |
| cx.common.suite = Some(cs); |
| |
| // This is the draft19 change where the transcript became a tree |
| let transcript = self |
| .next |
| .transcript_buffer |
| .start_hash(cs.hash_algorithm()); |
| let mut transcript_buffer = transcript.into_hrr_buffer(); |
| transcript_buffer.add_message(&m); |
| |
| // Early data is not allowed after HelloRetryrequest |
| if cx.data.early_data.is_enabled() { |
| cx.data.early_data.rejected(); |
| } |
| |
| let may_send_sct_list = self |
| .next |
| .hello |
| .server_may_send_sct_list(); |
| |
| let key_share = match req_group { |
| Some(group) if group != offered_key_share.group() => { |
| let group = kx::KeyExchange::choose(group, &self.next.config.kx_groups) |
| .ok_or_else(|| { |
| cx.common |
| .illegal_param("server requested hrr with bad group") |
| })?; |
| kx::KeyExchange::start(group).ok_or(Error::FailedToGetRandomBytes)? |
| } |
| _ => offered_key_share, |
| }; |
| |
| Ok(emit_client_hello_for_retry( |
| self.next.config, |
| cx, |
| self.next.resuming_session, |
| self.next.random, |
| self.next.using_ems, |
| transcript_buffer, |
| self.next.sent_tls13_fake_ccs, |
| self.next.hello, |
| Some(self.next.session_id), |
| Some(hrr), |
| self.next.server_name, |
| Some(key_share), |
| self.extra_exts, |
| may_send_sct_list, |
| Some(cs), |
| )) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectServerHelloOrHelloRetryRequest { |
| fn handle(self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError { |
| match m.payload { |
| MessagePayload::Handshake { |
| parsed: |
| HandshakeMessagePayload { |
| payload: HandshakePayload::ServerHello(..), |
| .. |
| }, |
| .. |
| } => self |
| .into_expect_server_hello() |
| .handle(cx, m), |
| MessagePayload::Handshake { |
| parsed: |
| HandshakeMessagePayload { |
| payload: HandshakePayload::HelloRetryRequest(..), |
| .. |
| }, |
| .. |
| } => self.handle_hello_retry_request(cx, m), |
| payload => Err(inappropriate_handshake_message( |
| &payload, |
| &[ContentType::Handshake], |
| &[HandshakeType::ServerHello, HandshakeType::HelloRetryRequest], |
| )), |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| pub(super) fn send_cert_error_alert(common: &mut CommonState, err: Error) -> Error { |
| match err { |
| Error::InvalidCertificateEncoding => { |
| common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError); |
| } |
| Error::PeerMisbehavedError(_) => { |
| common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter); |
| } |
| _ => { |
| common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::BadCertificate); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| err |
| } |